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Religious texts, narratives, and history often provide the template by which 
religious leaders and their communities of faith frame actual events in modern times.  In 
2007, while conducting interviews in Egypt with leading figures from the  Muslim and 
Christian communities, the author noted frequent comparisons,  both favorable and 
unfavorable, between  the dhimmi experience lived by Christians as separate millets in 
the past to describe the present  conditions of the sizeable Christian minority living in 
Egypt today.  This thesis investigates to what extent the parallels and analogies between 
the past and the present are valid and illuminating, and to what extent they are actually 
confounding, conflating, and obfuscating what is really going on. After identifying the 
hallmarks of the historical system by which the dominant Muslim authority managed its 
religious minorities in terms of spirit, ethos and practice, there follows a comparison of 
the main characteristics of the historical experience based on chronicles of Christians 
living as citizens in the modern Egyptian state. The thesis argues that although the origins 
of some current practices can be validated in some particulars, the dhimmi narrative as 
analogy is largely essentialism, and a rhetorical device, largely because it lacks the 
systemic, discriminatory intentionality and application exemplified by the millet system. 
As a way of understanding historical connections between the present and the past, it has 
limited and circumscribed utility. Deployed as narrative or analogy by which to make 
meaning out of the present, it reinforces stereotypes, confounds attempts at conflict 
resolution, and infuses the future with an unwarranted sense of pre-ordained path 
determinacy. It leaves much to be desired as a useful analogy, but is useful in terms of 
developing taxonomy of attitudes and positions regarding the place of Christians in 
today’s Egyptian state. 
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I. INTRODUCTION   
A. PURPOSE   
For four months in 2007, I had the privilege of conducting research on Christian-
Muslim relations in Egypt. In my conversations with a variety of religious leaders, I was 
struck by how frequently they made reference to the dhimmi experience and the historic 
religio-juridical system by which the Muslim majority managed relations with non-
Muslim members of their societies. It was clear they were drawing parallels between this 
historical experience and current interactions between Christians and Muslims living in 
modern Egypt. 
The term dhimmi or ahl al dhimma, like many historical references, comes laden 
with multiple meanings and connotations, depending on the interlocutor and the 
audience.  Because of the frequency of the reference to the dhimmi history and because it 
was deployed by both Muslims and Christians, and not just in a pejorative way, but also 
in a positive way, I came to formulate the hypothesis that this might not just be a simple 
rhetorical device or hyperbole. Hence, in this thesis, I have evaluated the extent to which 
it is valid to deploy this historical and religio-juridical term to describe current Christian-
Muslim interactions in Egypt. I attempt to get behind the rhetoric and determine the 
extent to which such an analogy is sustainable by facts, and the extent to which it is not. 
If grounded in fact, then one would expect to see a significant degree of correlation 
between past and present, i.e., historical continuity. From the outset, this study envisioned 
the following possible outcomes:  
  
1. A high degree of continuity between the past and the present, thus 
validating the use of the analogy. 
2. An insignificant degree of continuity and, correspondingly, a high degree 
of discontinuity between the past and the present, indicating that such a 
comparison is spurious. 
3. Varying degrees of both continuity and discontinuity are present between 
past and present. 
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4. Differential treatment, as applied to non-Muslims in the past, indeed exists 
today, but the conditions and practices are so different from those found in 
the historical record that the application of the dhimmi label today in this 
context is inaccurate. 
 
I will argue that the treatment of non-Muslims in the past as dhimmi was far from 
being a uniform and universal expression of Muslim-Christian relations in all contexts. In 
order to avoid deploying what, in effect, is an essentialism, one must exercise great care 
in characterizing all apparent discrimination as analogous with the historical record, and 
thus, refrain from generalizations based on a few specifics. I will argue that while, in fact, 
there exists a high degree of correlation between certain specific historical moments and 
specific practices, and certain aspects of these practices, and this is still far different from 
the intentional, systemic and institutionalized approach to governing non-Muslim 
minorities as represented by the millet system. One can justify the claim that individual 
discriminatory practices have historical roots in the dhimmi experience, but one cannot 
say that this is tantamount to “dhimmitude,” just as it would be inaccurate to assert that 
slavery still existed in the United States based on discriminatory practices that persisted 
in segregated areas of the U.S. nearly a century following the emancipation proclamation. 
The cognitive, political, and historical power of the term is undeniably potent and thus 
tempting to deploy. While it is correct to recognize the legacy of individual practices that 
carry an historic weight, one should not confuse the footprints, with the feet. 
The historic dhimmi experience was an intentionally institutionalized system, 
expressed in ways normative and regulatory, religiously sanctioned and officially 
implemented. It regulated or delegated for regulation the public life of the minority 
religious community.  I, thus, posit that in Egypt today, though largely discriminatory and 
usually (though not always) disadvantageous to the Christian population, current 
practices should be considered fragments of historical residue to which the term dhimmi 
or ahl al dhimma should not be applied. Though it leaves much to be desired as a useful 
analogy, is useful to understand how it is deployed and by whom and for what purposes. 




society understand the past, how they relate in the present and how they envision the 
future.  It is thus useful in developing taxonomy of positions regarding   the place of 
Christians in today’s Egyptian state. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Christian-Muslim relations in Egypt merit study for many reasons. First, Egypt 
has the longest continuous, documented history of Christian and Muslim relations. 
Moreover, to be able to study  Christian-Muslim relations in modern times, one must be 
able to find actual situations where sizeable and well-defined Christian and Muslim 
communities consciously interact with each other, not just as individuals, or through their 
religious leaders, but corporately, communally, and on multiple levels to include the 
economic, educational, the artistic, the cultural, and the political. Egypt, perhaps unlike 
other places on the globe, provides an opportunity to study both historic, as well as 
significantly sizeable populations that interact according to modern and well as ancient 
lines, and respond to political issues still today based on constructed notions of sectarian 
identity.  Finally, the fact that there is not a clear-cut separation of religion and 
governance also means Egypt is even more of a living laboratory for studying the 
political aspects of how non-Muslim religious minorities govern their common life 
together.   
Religious history, especially in the Egypt, provides a rich repository, a veritable 
goldmine of schemata with which to frame reality. Moreover, religious history is no 
ordinary history, but contains the potency of divine sanction. It has the power to confer a 
sense of the sacred, of the numinous, of the divinely ordained and anointed order, derived 
from immutable, transcendent truths. As such systems and causes  that seem to be 
grounded on their principles and leaders that invoke their divine power or quote from 
their sacred scriptures have infinitely greater power than if they were to use secular 
analogies and parallels. Religious leaders and their communities draw on this history and 
attribute meaning to events based on shared memory and an internally validated system 
of making meaning—a system of “coding.” It is not just how words are used, but also the 
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authority and the gravitas of the interlocutor who deploys the narrative that reveals much 
about how they and their community (audience) construct the past, present, and future.     
Kees Hulsman, sociologist and co-founder of the Center for Arab-West 
Understanding (CAWU), told Daily News Egypt  (Misr al –Yaum) that in the same way 
that Muslims are becoming more assertive in America, Copts are becoming more 
assertive in Egypt and that this puts a strain on Muslim-Christian ties around the world. 
Hulsman added that “whatever happens in Egypt between Muslim and Christians, will 
have an effect in the West because these are not domestic issues; they have effects 
outside of their borders.”1 I believe that Hulsman is correct. Because historical references 
abound in the contemporary discourse of Christian-Muslim relations, I assert that in the 
case of modern Egypt, the parallels drawn to the dhimmi experience, whether true or 
false, are not simply diagnostic, but play important roles in terms of justification and 
policy advocacy.  I am convinced that studying and questioning the terms of discourse 
and the ways that Christians and Muslim go about understanding their shared past, and  
more importantly, construct and imagine their present and future is essential to generating 
light, where sometimes all that has existed is a great deal of heat.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to Hastings, “language, ethnicity, nationalism, and religion are four 
distinct and determinative elements within world history.”2  They are core concepts for 
every human and they help guide individual and group motivations while determining 
how these entities will react to certain situations. All four are closely linked to each other, 
as Hastings argues, and in examining the nature of modern Christian-Muslim relations in 
Egypt, they are difficult to separate one from the other. However, to Hastings’ list, I 
would also add another element: history itself. History operates, at least in the case of this 
thesis, as both stage and actor. In every encounter that I witnessed between Christians and 
                                                 
1 Ruqqaya Izzidien, “Analysis: Drawing parallels between Copts in Egypt and Muslims in the West,” 
Daily News-Egypt, August 14, 2009, http://thedailynewsegypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=23841 (accessed 
September 11, 2009). 




Muslims, history cast its shadows or beamed its spotlights, and in every scene, history 
made its appearance and recited its lines. In culling through the primary and secondary 
sources, I found much had been written about Christian-Muslim relations in Egypt from 
both Muslim and Christian viewpoints As this study is a comparison of the present to the 
past, the review of the literature became like a large, extended, fractious family reviewing 
generations of scrapbooks, where one aunt exclaims, “Look how the baby is smiling; he 
is the spitting image of your father!” —to which her son-in-law retorts, “I don’t think he 
looks much like anyone in our family; I think he’s all yours!” 
Historical accounts written by Egyptians and Christians, as well as secular 
sources, from the classical to the modern periods, documented quite well how the 
dominant Muslim society managed its non-Muslim minorities during specific periods 
and/or how Christians and other non-Muslims survived or coexisted under Muslim rule. 
Yet, there seems to be a gap in the literature where little has been done to 
comprehensively compare treatment of Christians in modern Egypt to the treatment of 
Christians as dhimmis under the historical millet system.  I did, however, find numerous 
incidental claims about the analogy based on one or two parameters, such as church 
repair, conversion, or citizenship. Some tended to support the analogy’s validity, finding 
evidence of “dhimmitude” in many of the negative aspects of modern Egyptian society. 
Others vehemently denied any evidence of continued historically based discrimination, 
and if anything pointed to what they saw as the more favorable aspects. They saw the 
historical experience in a positive light and felt it still suitable as a model by which to 
govern inter-religious relations.  A few championed or denounced singular practices, 
advocating in the name of universal citizenship that these residual aspects of the millet 
legacy should be abolished. Most interestingly, the various attitudes cut across sectarian 
lines, indicating that Muslims and Christians were not of one mind. Somewhat 
surprisingly, there were Muslims who denounced the past and the present practices as 
violations of human rights. Likewise, there were Christians who viewed the past system 
(or at least certain aspects of it) with nostalgia, recalling only the protections and 
privileges, and rejecting any attempt to categorize Copts as historical minorities or 
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insinuate that they were other than full citizens. As Nielsen points out, the system as a 
model for inter-religious relations still has its fans, not just detractors: 
With regard to non-Muslim minorities, there are some scholars and 
activists who advocate the traditional practice of tolerating ahl al-kitab, 
Christians and Jews, as protected communities with specific rights, 
privileges, and duties. These scholars view such protection and toleration 
as a favour towards communities that are in essence subjugated. 
Contemporary proponents of this tradition rightly point out that this 
Treatment was far better than that which religious minorities generally 
experienced in Europe until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.3 
The more people I interviewed and the more I read, the more blurred the lines 
became. Just when I thought I understood the various motives behind the convergences 
and the cleavages an even more nuanced position would appear. 
I will cite some of the more recent scholarly voices as a way of demonstrating the 
variety and range of positions to be found in contemporary secondary sources. Because 
the number of sources who are simply documenting a particular historical moment are so 
numerous, I will restrict myself to those authors,  who in terms of the treatment of non-
Muslim religious minorities have not only attempted to chronicle and illuminate 
particular historical periods, but have also attempted to compare the different historical 
records as well. 
Bruce Masters characterizes the way in which modern Egypt, in dealing with its 
Christian minority stands at a cross roads between the present and its Ottoman past. 
Egypt, for him presents a living laboratory by which to examine the ways in which 
authorities manage interaction among religious groups across cultures. He identifies the 
very palpable tension in a society “both ruled by a pragmatic government and organized 
around a dominant, public, religious identity—the Islamic.”4 For Masters, modern Egypt 
is a study in contrasts and historical convergences, and is like looking at a double- 
 
                                                 
 3 Jorgen Nielsen, “Contemporary Discussions On Religious Minorities in Muslim Countries,” Islam 
and Christian-Muslim Relations 14, no. 3, Carfax Publishing (July 2003): 338. 
 4 Bruce Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism, 
Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001): 39.  
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exposed photograph where one observes “the uneasy coexistence between a pluralistic 
social environment and a demand for religious unity in both times [Ottoman and 
modern].”5 
Hugh Goddard, renowned modern scholar of the Crusades and Islam, in his book, 
A History of Christian-Muslim Relations in many ways frames the larger question that 
this thesis, in considering patterns of continuity and discontinuity, seeks to address. 
Goddard, in taking note of the Copts in Egypt as one of the “ancient, once-dominant 
Christian minorities” asks if the now dominant Muslim community will persist in its 
classical and medieval view of Christians as dhimmis who “should be brought low” or 
will they “move away from the classical concept of the Christian as dhimmi” and towards 
the “fuller equality and participation envisaged by the Constitution of Medina.”6 Note 
that Goddard does not claim that full equality can be obtained, only “fuller.”  Goddard 
holds a generally positive view of the Muslim world’s capability to deal with democracy 
and pluralism and is openly critical of authors like Bat Ye’or, who, make frequent 
negative references to the historic dhimmi experiences, having coined the neologism 
“dhimmitude” to describe the life of Christians under Abbasid and Ottoman rule. 
Goddard insists that such authors are unduly harsh and wrong to judge medieval Islam by 
the standards of the UN Declaration of Human Rights.7  Bat Ye’or is the pseudonym of a 
Jewish author who in The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam: from Jihad to 
Dhimmitude, suggests that minorities are beginning to confront Islamic leaders and to ask 
questions regarding their history and future. She claims that radical Islamist movements 
are nothing new, but represent something coded into the DNA of  Islam, which compels 
Muslims to conquer and  through jihad to impose of “dhimmitude.”8   She believes that 
the “approach of the Egyptian government to tackle Islamic extremists will not succeed 
                                                 
5  Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World, 39. 
6 Hugh Goddard, A History of Christian-Muslim Relations (Chicago, New Amsterdam Books, 2000): 
188. 
7 Ibid., 68. 
8 Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam: from Jihad to Dhimmitude (Madison, 
NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996): 220.     
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without. . . “a complete recasting of mentalities, the desacralization of the historical jihad 
and an unbiased examination of Islamic imperialism.”9  While her negative, and 
sometimes hostile characterizations of Islam  have been challenged by Goddard and 
others, there are those who feel the term “dhimmitude” to be a perfectly accurate mode of 
description for the historic conditions of most non-Muslims. 
Prominent contemporary Christian scholars and observers of Christian-Muslim 
relations such as Sydney Griffith, and Richard John Neuhaus, editor of the American 
Catholic magazine First Things are both Catholic who are critics of both modern 
Islamism and find the evidence for dhimmitude compelling: Griffith writes: 
The very mention of the legal disabilities that theoretically applied to 
Christians living within the Islamic polity forcefully reminds one of the 
sorrows of Dhimmitude, which Islamic law and practice imposed on the 
Jews and Christians, was a costly witness, and at times it entailed real 
martyrdom. While Christian martyrologies in Syriac, Coptic, Arabic and 
even Greek and Latin from the early Islamic period are not numerous, 
there are nonetheless some very important ones, which help the modern 
reader gain a better understanding of the sometimes precarious position of 
Christians in early Islamic society.10 
Griffith and Neuhaus, like the French theologian, Jacques Ellul, who is a 
Protestant, defend her neologism of dhimmitude as an accurate description of Islamic 
political and cultural hegemony and as indeed being analogous to current times. The 
latter, in reviewing her books applauds Ye’or scholarship as a counter to the “Islamophile 
histories” currently the trend and he emphasizes his conviction that from the beginning to 
the present, “Bat Ye’or persuasively demonstrates…Islam’s spectacular spread was brought 
about by brutal military conquest, rapine, spoliation, and slavery, joined to a regime of 
“dhimmitude” that was based on deep contempt for the subject infidels, including the Peoples of 
the Book.”11  
                                                 
 9 Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity, 218–220. 
 10 Sydney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow of the Mosque: Christians and Muslims in the World of 
Islam, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008): 146.  
 11  Richard John Neuhaus, “The Approaching Century of Religion,” First Things, October 1997 




While it may be easy to classify characterizations like Bat Ye’or’s “dhimmitude” 
as biased and highly agendized, it is much more difficult to dismiss the writing of S.S. 
Hassan, a female, Muslim, Egyptian scholar with access to Pope Shenouda and the 
Coptic hierarchy, as well as the Mubarak regime.  In Hassan, we find a powerful, 
authentically Egyptian voice who chronicles in great detail the vicissitudes of Egypt’s 
Christian community in modern times. In her book, Christians versus Muslims in Modern 
Egypt: A century-long struggle for equality, this author describes the Islamization process 
under Sadat with the accompanying wave of popular anti-secular preachers, who 
intimated  that  secular ideology was a Coptic program intended to divide the country and 
obstruct the revival of true Islam. Using the historic reference to the dhimmi experience, 
she forecast the contours of the future if the state failed to remain secular: 
In the Islamic nation, the Christian minority would have the status of 
second-class citizens: dhimmis, or protected people, and if Islamic Law 
(sharia) were applied to the Christians not only in general areas, but in 
family law as well, as the Islamic militants advocate, it would most 
probably entail the fragmentation of the Christian family units and their 
eventual assimilations in the Islamic community.12 
Hassan’s comments above indicate that the dhimmi theme is not only retrieved to 
describe present conditions, it is also deployed in a prophetic manner to forecast and 
frame the future.  Other Egyptian secular Muslims also find aspects of the dhimmi legacy 
alive in the here and now. According to Saad’Eddine Ibrahim, the noted Muslim 
Egyptian professor of sociology and long-time critic of the Mubarak regime, there is 
good reason to believe that in spirit and, indeed, in some specific cases, the treatment of 
Christians according to a historical model of tutelage and domination persists. He decries 
the fact that until 2005, the Humayonic which required a presidential permit for the 
building or repair of churches was still on the books as “the remnants of an Ottoman law” 
and “deeply entrenched religious discrimination in Egypt.” 13 However, while lamenting 
the persistence the historical legacy, Ibrahim stops short of claiming that in modern Egypt 
                                                 
 12 S. S. Hasan, Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt: The Century-Long Struggle for Coptic 
Equality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003):106. 
 13 Sa’ad Eddine Ibrahim, “Christians Oppressed,” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) New York, 
November 18, 2005,  A.16.  
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Christians live officially as dhimmis.  Ibrahim, for many years director of the Ibn 
Khaldun Center in Cairo, feels that while the Egyptian constitution holds all members of 
the three heavenly religions to be equal citizens, in reality, Christians are effectively not 
equal. To Ibrahim and other secularists they suffer the plight of the minority at the hand 
of the majority. He and his center advocate for them to be legally classified as minorities 
and, by law, to receive certain protections in the name of ensuring minority rights. 
Ironically, his position has been opposed by many Christians, most prominently the 
Coptic leader, Pope Shenouda, who like many Copts, but also liberal Muslims, feels  that 
this is a reduction of Copts once more to de jure dhimmi status—something very 
negative. The pope states that “we are not a minority in Egypt. We don’t like to consider 
ourselves a minority and do not like others to call us a minority.”14 Ibrahim, on the other 
hand, feels that despite the constitutional affirmation that Copts are full citizens, they live 
as unprotected and subjugated minorities. According to his version, the Pope Shenouda 
rejects the categorization because it smacks of a return to official dhimmi status and the 
Mubarak government rejects the classification because it would be an embarrassing 
admission; that the government has failed to develop a truly egalitarian society.  
Not all Copts agree with their pope either. Shawky Karas, President of the 
American Coptic Society insists that as long as the Egyptian state privileges Islam as the 
official religion and the constitution maintains the shari’ah as the main source of the civil 
code then discrimination and conflict is inevitable. Christians will always be second-class 
citizens because in his view, the “injunctions of the Qur’an constitute no less than a 
comprehensive blueprint for society.”15  Karas suggests that the desire to make Christians 
dhimmis under Islamic rule remains.  He believes that President Mubarak, while paying 
lip service to equality for all, has been continuing the same policy of religious oppression 
and discrimination against Egypt’s Christians as Sadat did, but without sanctioning or 
encouraging physical attacks.    
                                                 
 14 Pope Shenouda, Human Rights Watch, 1994,  37, in Paul Sedra, “Class Cleavages and Ethnic 
Conflict: Coptic Christian Communities  in Modern Ethnic Conflict,” Islam and Christian-Muslim 
Relations 10, no. 2 (1999): 219. 
15 Shawky Karas, The Copts since the Arab Invasions: Strangers in their own Land  (Jersey City, N.J: 
American Coptic Association, 1985): 93. 
11 
 
Egypt’s officially sanctioned and government sponsored Islamic institutions are 
synched. Al Azhar and   Pope Shenouda, sing a similar song. Ali Gomaa, the Grand 
Mufti of Egypt and a modernist prefers to focus on the spirit of the law and dismiss 
abuses as incidental and aberrant manifestations that reflect an imperfect level of 
education among the general population. The Grand Mufti, while recognizing there is 
widespread discrimination, asserts that the Egyptian constitution and the shari’ah, too are 
both completely compatible with the values of democracy and the French Enlightenment. 
He adamantly denies that such abuse and practices are a function of the system (Lesa ka 
nazzam). 16     
It is also important to understand how Pope Shenouda’s claims of full Coptic 
equality have been in some ways undermined by the Western media and scholars who 
cannot help but see the Christian community as victims of Islamist oppression and 
characterize their situation as anything but that of full citizens. Western scholars of 
Egyptian Islamism note the resentment that radical Islamists feel towards Copts to whom 
the “secular” government has given at least on paper equal citizenship, something which 
they believe the shari’ah forbids.  For example, Gilles Kepel, the noted French journalist 
and author of numerous books on radical Islam writes that “for the Islamist movement, to 
assault the Copts is to assault the state.”17 While crediting the government with 
attempting at least in public to uphold constitution, in his Muslim Extremism in Egypt,  
Kepel identifies the gap between the actual versus the ideal. Like many skeptical 
Westerners, Kepel here has identified true center of gravity in terms of inter-religious 
relations, an inconvenient truth for the some Copts.   
There are other modernist Muslims, however, who are not secularists but Post-
Islamists. They see the way forwards is to get back to the pristine times of the early 
Muslim community. While denouncing discriminatory practices, they feel that secularism 
                                                 
 16 Ali Gomaa  in G. Martin “An Interview with Ali Gomaa, Grand Mufti of Egypt,”  The Army 
Chaplaincy: Professional Bulletin of the Unit Ministry Team, Ft Jackson, S.C (Winter-Spring: 2009): 54–
57. 
 17 Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremists in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh, trans. J. Rothschild 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993): 240. 
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has been tried and found wanting. The radical Islamist solution that deploys the classical 
juridical formula to subjugate non-Muslims is even more repugnant to Muqtader Khan. A  
former fellow at the Brookings Institute and director of International Studies  at Adrian 
College in Michigan, Khan asserts that in a true Islamic state “communities with different 
religious orientations enjoy religious autonomy which essentially is wider in scope that 
the modern idea of religious freedom.”  Claiming that “the principles of equality, 
consensual governance and pluralism are enmeshed in the “Compact of Medina” these 
values can actually be “an excellent model for developing modern Islamic 
democracies.”18 For them, a truly Islamic state with a “modified” dhimmi based on the 
original Quranic ideal would be best. 
Admittedly, folks like Khan are somewhat removed from the reality of Egypt, and 
one could easily critique his views as presenting the ideal and not the real.  Yet, his view 
is not unique. Most interesting in this regard is the nuanced and highly controversial 
position of Rafiq Habib, a Coptic Evangelical, the son of a former bishop and  one of the 
founders of Egypt’s  Islamic Party,  Hizb al Wasat al Islami. The Wasat or the “middle 
party”  also  seeks a  third, post-Islamist way of co-existence, and broke off from the 
Muslim Brotherhood in 1996, who they saw as unrealistically and un-Islamically clinging 
to worn-out road maps for international and inter-religious relations, such as Dar al Harb 
and Dar al Islam. The fundamental point that makes Wasat post-Islamist for our 
purposes, is that instead of defining Islam as a religion, it defines it as a culture, or 
civilization, which is inclusive of minorities. Thinking of Islam as a culture is similar to 
how certain people in the West refer to the West as “Judeo-Christian,” while still leaving 
room for Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and others to practice freely therein. Thus, Habib, 
the chief ideologue of the party for many years, envisions an Islamic culture which 
belongs to Christians as well as Muslims. In Habib’s thought, to be a dhimmi is to be an 
essential Christian minority member of an Islamic culture and society. Habib believes the  
 
 
                                                 
 18   Muqtader Khan,  “Prospects for Muslim Democracy: The Role of U.S. Policy,” Middle East Policy  
X, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 86. 
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Shari`ah can be viewed as a tool to facilitate modernity, if interpreted properly by 
democratically elected religious officials, not state-appointed ones as those currently 
ruling from al-Azhar.   
Randall Henderson, a Christian, though secular scholar is cautious in approaching 
the easy labeling of discrimination as tantamount to “dhimmitude.” Moreover, he 
reminds the reader the not all aspects of the dhimmi experience were negative and that in 
many ways the past system had many advantageous over the present one. In many ways, 
his scholarship strengthens the post-Islamist solution and that of the Wasatiyya, including 
Rafiq Habib’s. Henderson, in suggesting that it would be inaccurate to characterize the 
historic dhimmi experience as a negative one, claims it would be wrong to use the term 
dhimmi as a synonym for present forms of injustice against Christians. He points out that 
certain advantages for Christians existed in the historical contexts that, in fact, do not 
exist in Egypt today. Henderson warns: 
…while it is tempting to conclude that this system worked against them, 
Copts and Jews [they] often took their family litigation to Islamic courts 
which were open to all religious groups during the Ottoman period. There 
they could achieve a divorce or litigate other problems that Church court 
would not have permitted. This was particularly beneficial to non-Muslim 
women who were locked in unwanted marriages.19 
In conclusion, the literature is rich enough to allow a comparison between the two 
historical moments, and to determine if any pattern can be discerned by comparing 
multiple common practices and policies. It also reflects many more nuanced positions 
than I expected to find and thus lends itself to analysis on a variety of levels. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
I should note that I intend this to be a “thick,” descriptive and comparative study, 
rather than an analytical undertaking with clearly labeled dependent and independent 
variables. I will identify the main characteristics, policies, ethos and norms of the 
historical dhimmi experience in Egypt and compare them to current state of affairs among 
                                                 
 19  Randall Henderson, “The Egyptian Coptic Christians: The Conflict Between Identity and 
Equality,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 16, no. 2, Routledge  (April 2005): 157. 
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Coptic Christians living in Modern Egypt to see it the analogy is valid.  The comparative 
case-study methodology lends itself well to the study of similar phenomenon across time, 
and  is one of the basic techniques used to establish general empirical propositions and 
discover empirical relationships among variables.  As Stretton posits, “comparison is 
strongest as a choosing and provoking, not a proving, device; a system for questioning, 
not answering.” Generalizations drawn from a comparative case study, even one of few 
cases, can perhaps assist with further theory development when tested within a wider 
sample.20 Thus, I intend to engage in a certain amount of comparative historical analysis 
in which I will place the statements and actions of contemporary religious leaders about 
current political and social issues in modern-day Egypt in historical perspective.  I also 
hope that once such a descriptive study is complete that certain hypotheses could be 
formulated about correlations, if not causality, with possible indicators of inter-religious 
strife or harmony. This study then would lay the groundwork for a future, more analytical 
study with even some quantitative aspects.   
My first task, as demonstrated above was to conduct a review and establish the 
contours of the discourse. How is the dhimmi narrative being retrieved? By whom and for 
what purposes? What are the political and religious positions and do they follow sectarian 
cleavages?   
In Chapter II,   “Key Characteristics of the Historical Dhimmi Experience,” I turn 
first to the Qur’an and the ahadith and then survey  a variety of historical accounts from 
the Pact of Umar up to the firmans of the Ottoman Millet system. While careful not to 
essentialize and create the appearance of a universal application of norms to non-Muslims 
in all places at all times, I believe I have been able to eliminate situational idiosyncrasies, 
localized manifestations and particulars, and to distill from the record those aspects of the 
dhimmi experience which transcend any cultural context or historical moment and instead 
are universals. I go back as far as the time of Mohammed and move forward to the end of 
the Sadat era. Thus, the historical dhimmi experience against which I compare the case of 
                                                 
 20  H. Stratton in Arendt Lipjhart,” The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research,” 
Comparative Political Studies 8/2 (July 1975): 160. 
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Copts in modern Egypt is focused on eight normative social and political categories. 
These are the general areas wherein Christians, according to classical Islamic 
jurisprudence and custom, as religious minorities, traditionally received different 
treatment from Muslims: 
  
a. Religion’s Constitutional relationship to the state 
b. Legal Status of Citizens 
c. Government/Military Service 
d. Taxation 
e. Church building and repair 
f. Religious Practices  
g. Communal representation  
h. Conversions and Apostasy   
Once having identified and defined the overarching norms that characterize the 
historical dhimmi experience, taking into account geographic and temporal variations, I  
take actual statements about Christian-Muslim relations made by contemporary religious 
leaders and place them and analyze them in their cultural and historical context. These 
comments come from interviews that I conducted while in Egypt during the summer of 
2007. As a priest of the Anglican Communion, I was able to avail myself of relationships 
and contacts that are the fruit of pre-existing ecumenical agreements between my church 
and Muslim leaders. Thanks to the ecumenical accords that existed between my church 
leaders (particularly the Archbishop of Canterbury) and the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, I 
was able to interview many influential and key members from both the Muslim and 
Christian communities most of whom here will remain anonymous with the exception of 
Dr Ali-Gomaa, the Grand Mufti of all Egypt.  In addition to the aforementioned official 
contacts, I also spoke “off-line” to a variety of clergy and religious leaders, local 
journalists, politicians, and diplomats at the U.S.  Embassy in Cairo, and other secular 
subject matter experts who also provided valuable insights. Some interviews were 
conducted in English, others in Arabic depending on the level of fluency and preference 
of the person being interviewed. I also monitored the local press, and perused the 
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archives of the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Affairs.  The comments will 
serve as a springboard into the historical, and if necessary, the theological issues, context, 
and backdrop against which they can be better understood.   
After summarizing my findings, I move on to Chapter III where I compare the 
historical record with contemporary relations, beginning with the rise to power in 1981 of 
President Hosni Mubarak, following the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. A 
summary of the findings concludes the chapter.  
In Chapter IV, I engage in a point-by-point comparison of each of the above-
mentioned categories. I analyze the dhimmi experience, historical and modern, and report 
my findings in terms of continuity or discontinuity with the past, noting specific 
practices, traceable or not to the historical experiences. I note similarities and 
dissimilarities and with the historical record, attempting to distinguish simple unrelated 
sectarianism and discrimination, from that rooted in patterns of historical behavior. I 
employ reports from human rights groups, the U.S. State Department, and Egyptian 
historians and sociologists. I provide an interpretation of the findings and a 
contextualization of the findings in the political life of modern Egypt.  In this chapter, I 
explain those who have the most to gain from continuing to perpetuate the dhimmi 
narrative and conditions, and those who have the most to lose if it were to be challenged, 
questioned, circumscribed or even abandoned.  I also offer possible explanations and 
relate them to theories of human behavior and cognitive theory where possible.   
In my conclusions,   I analyze how the dhimmi analogy is deployed, what it means 
to those who deploy it, and how it currently shapes modern sectarian relations, and 
develop taxonomy of positions. 
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II. THE HISTORICAL DHIMMI EXPERIENCE  
A. THE ETHOS 
Any attempt to analyze the historical record and distill from it the key aspects of 
the dhimmi experience is fraught with challenges simply because of the variations in 
time, culture, and location. Has there been a universal dhimmi experience? I think that 
questions such as this    that inveigh one into binary thinking are most unhelpful here. I 
have steered away from looking for specific rules and regulations but rather aspects of 
social differentiation that indicate an ethos, a pattern, and a set of norms. Thus, I prefer to 
wrestle with a more nuanced question in mind:  to what extent can one identify common 
themes, stances, attitudes, and policies that could reflect the presence of a set of 
universally accepted norms for governing relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in 
a Muslim society?  Since my intent is to eventually compare the historical dhimmi 
experience with the actual one, I am intentionally casting a wide net. I do so with the 
conviction that, because specific cases and  regulations vary in the details and contexts,  
the only legitimate way to determine the validity of the dhimmi analogy, is to examine 
primarily the norms, and only secondarily the specific rules, and only to the extent that 
the specific can suggest something universal and  general. The documentation regarding 
the practices commonly applied to non-Muslims is extensive, and far beyond the scope of 
this paper to catalogue and classify all of them. Nevertheless, in surveying the record, it is 
possible to identify several key and influential policies that were formulated, and that laid 
the foundation for a comprehensive tradition that allowed local adaptation and 
modification.  I will move through the categories outlined in the first chapter and then 
conclude with a summary of my findings as a way of establishing a baseline for 
comparison. 
B. SCRIPTURAL GUIDANCE: NON-MUSLIMS 
Even before Muhammad’s death in the year 632 CE, interactions between the 
growing Muslim community and the local ‘People of the Book’ who were living in the 
environs of the new city-state of Medina, had reached a point where Qur’anic verses were 
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needed to dictate a principle to establish norms that addressed the  relationship between 
the Muslims, the Jews, and Christians.  The occasions for the revelations (asbab al 
nuzuul) suggest that these Quranic directives came down in response to conflict and jihad 
between the Muslims and their fellow citizens of Medina. Within the Qur’an there is 
usually clear distinction made between polytheists (Mushrikoon) and People of the Book, 
with much greater respect shown to the latter and for our purposes, then we will only 
look at specific references to ahl al kitab or ahl al dhimma, careful not to conflate them 
with other categories of non-Muslims. Nevertheless, the specific Quranic references to 
the ahl al-dhimma establish early on their inferior status in society, primarily for their 
seeming recalcitrance shown to the Quranic message and the new prophet. Their beliefs 
moreover are errant and misguided. Thus, we see that in the nascent period of Islamic 
history, while still under the prophet, the precedents for the management (toleration, 
subjugation and protection) of Jews and Christians, as the ahl al-kitab, first became 
formulated. The Quranic text tells the Muslims: 
Fight those among the ‘People of the Book’ who do not believe in Allah 
and the Last Day, who do not forbid what Allah and His Messenger have 
forbidden and do not profess the true religion, till they pay the poll-tax out 
of  hand and submissively. The Jews say Ezra is the Son of God, while the 
Christians say the Messiah is the son of God. Such are their assertions, by 
which they imitate the infidels of old. God confound them! How perverse 
they are!  (Q:IX:29-30) 
While some interpreters say that the verses above were largely addressing non-
Muslims outside Medina, there are other early references to questions concerning the 
status of monotheistic non-Muslims who lived within the Medinan Islamic community as 
well. These, too, appeared during the life of Mohammed,   especially once he and the 
community moved to Medina where Muhammad offered a settlement, known as the 
“Constitution of Medina,” which allowed other Jews and some non-Muslims in the area 
to retain their own law and religion. The first use of the term “dhimma,” referring to 
security for protected peoples, appeared in this agreement. Regarding the meaning of the 
term itself, there is even some variation in shade of meaning. Some prefer to find the 
meaning in the verbal root of the Arabic word, which basically means “to affix blame” or 
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“to find fault.” However, others have suggested that dhimma means, rather benignly, “to 
be under the care of” or to be “protected” i.e., under the protection and responsibility of 
the Islamic government. In classical Islamic times the dhimmi populations were to be 
governed through the offices of their own leaders who were then held responsible for 
both the taxes and the good behavior of those under their care. 
C. EARLY RULINGS 
Based on the early conception of dhimma, Christians and Jews received the right 
to worship and retain their own religious customs in exchange for the jizya, a head tax, 
which marked the ahl al-dhimma. There seems to be multiple reasons for this tax. One 
motive, as articulated in the Quran was that of   humiliation for failing to accept the 
prophet’s revelation, and one might infer as a way of applying social pressure to 
encourage conversion. Another reason, cited by some is that later on it became a charge 
levied in lieu of the obligation to perform military service. Be that as it may, if the ahl al 
dhimma refused to pay the jizya he was considered by all jurists to have not kept his end 
of  the agreement, which automatically restored to the umma its initial rights of war—to 
kill and to dispossess the dhimmi, or to expel them, because they dared to revert to their 
status of being an unsubjected infidel. Courbage and Fargues write: 
Before launching an attack he (Muhammed) would offer them three 
choices—conversion, payment of a tribute, or to fight by the sword. If 
they did not choose conversion, a treaty was concluded, either instead of 
battle or after it, which established the conditions of surrender for the 
Christians and Jews—the only non-Muslims allowed retaining their 
religion at this time. The terms of these treaties were similar and imposed 
on the dhimmi, the people ‘protected’ by Islam, certain obligations. 21  
Moving in the early life of the community in the first centuries after the death of 
Mohammed, we find that, despite some evolving differences in the four schools of 
Islamic Sunni jurisprudence, there appears near unanimity in matters concerning the 
dhimmis. We read of them extensively in Abu Yusuf (731-98), a follower of Abu Hanifa 
                                                 




(d. 767), who was the founder of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence. He explained his 
views at length in a treatise written for the caliph Harun al-Rashid (786-809). In his book 
on the kharaj (land tax), Abu Yusuf declared that the governor should not exempt any 
Jew, Christian, or other dhimmis from the jizya: “and no one can obtain a partial 
reduction. It is illegal for one to be exempted and another not, for their lives and 
belongings are spared only because of payment of the poll tax.” 22 
Here we see how the classical view developed by the qadi and madhahabs  holds  
that the tax is to be considered the price to be paid by the “People of the Boo”’ for the 
“covenant of protection” (adh-dhimmah) which the Islamic government provides for 
them.  There evolved the notion of the dhimmi as a community towards which Muslims 
had a special responsibility- as one does towards one’s dependents.  However, many 
would say, this was not always so benign and certainly not without a note of 
condescension, subjugation, and sometimes mistreatment. 
From these origins, a much more tightly regulated structure for the ahl al-dhimma 
would develop under the Abbasid caliphs as the shari’ah expanded into a comprehensive 
system of law for Muslims as the empire expanded and incorporated large numbers of 
non-Muslims and many Christians.23  In these later Islamic times, jurists created a 
statutory principle, using scriptures to support a social policy that discriminated between 
Muslims and the “People of the Book.”  In recent times, some modern Islamic scholars 
have come to insist that these classical jurists, like Abu Yusuf cited above, in their 
eagerness to oblige the caliph and support the program of conquest, illegitimately 
expanded and twisted scriptures to facilitate subjugation of the non-Muslim community. 
Moreover, they decry the way that this legacy has reverberated across the centuries, and 
still today is retrieved and reworked by militants. Abdul Aziz Sachedina observes the 
following: 
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. .. the political situation of Muslim societies had far-reaching 
consequences for the ways in which the Qur’anic teachings about 
pluralism were sometimes ignored in order to gain control over conquered 
peoples. The active employment by contemporary militant Muslim leaders 
of the violent precedents that were set at those dark moments of Muslim 
history points to the tension that exists between the qur’anic principles of 
justice and fair treatment of non-Muslims and the demands of maintaining 
the political vision of an ever-expanding dar al Islam. 24 
By the year 732, just one hundred years after the death of Muhammad, Muslim 
military forces had consolidated their control over a large stretch of territory outside of 
Arabia which thereafter would become the heartland of what  some now call the 
“Islamicate” societies.25  This expanse of territory, embracing major portions of the 
Roman and Persian empires of Late Antiquity, included numerous Christians. It is 
important to note that perhaps 50 percent of the world’s confessing Christians from the 
mid-seventh to the end of the eleventh centuries found themselves living under Muslim 
rule.26   
D.  RELIGION AND THE STATE 
Having briefly outlined the earliest  and foundational norms and experiences that 
over the centuries influenced Muslim-Christian relations, I will not begin to look at 
those areas that  I have identified  as being representative of  the larger, systemic 
dhimmi experience. The first I will address is the relationship between religion and the 
state.  
Once Mohammed and his community arrived in Medina, Islam became political 
and the fledgling state took on a religious identity. However, the religion expanded to 
embrace a political agenda as well.  The earliest notion that Islam is both a religion and a 
state i.e., din-w-dawla can be traced back to this time. After Mohammed’s death in 632 
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CE, in the Sunni model, the scholarly class—the Ulema-wielded power, particularly 
legal-juridical and religious power over the caliph, or amir al-mu’miniin. This caliph 
wielded the sword and was the representative of the temporal authority. Without going 
into a long description of the various ways in which the ulema and the amir al mu’miniin 
co-operated and the spheres in which they operated, suffice it to say that there was a 
kind of mediation between culture and religion and the needs of the state.   
In the Islamic polity, unlike foundational Christianity or the modern secularism to 
which it gave birth, religion is not divorced from the public agenda, leaving adherents of 
competing doctrines free to pursue their beliefs engenders an inherent tension between 
religious communities that has to be resolved through state regulation.   Contrary to the 
pluralistic spirit of the Qur’an, Muslim jurists encouraged a state-sponsored 
institutionalization of the inferiority of non-Muslims, including the monotheist ahl al-
dhimma, as necessary for the well-being of the Muslim public order.  Operationally, too, 
because in the Islamic polity, religion is not divorced from the public agenda, the need 
for public order  has to be balanced and resolved through state regulation. Historically, in 
the name of order, this included the state regulating religious expression and practice.  
Muslim jurists encouraged a state-sponsored institutionalization of the inferiority of non-
Muslims, including the monotheist ahl al-dhimma  as necessary for the well-being of the 
Muslim public order. For these classical legal scholars, unbelievers had been offered 
Islam and rejected it. Therefore, it followed that their inferiority was not imposed, but 
freely chosen. Rulings related to non-Muslims were thus formulated in the context of 
Muslim states in control of defining its relation with those ruled by them.  The rulings in 
large measure, reflect politico-social situational aspects of interpersonal relations in 
juridical decisions, rather than the theological underpinnings of interfaith relations in the 
Islamic creed. The Islamic tradition evolved into an instrument for the simple furthering 
of the Muslim political and social agenda for power. i.e., the Muslim state’s hegemonic 
control over other groups and nations. This pattern persisted, not just as an artifact of 
medieval Muslim conquest, but as a system that continued through to Ottoman time until 




….the position of Islam at the emergence of the Ottomans and its 
institutionalization at the height of empire made it so that religion was 
adapted to the needs of the state, and contributed to the segmented 
integration of groups into the state. In their construction of the imperial 
realm Ottomans separated and differentiated between religion as 
institution and religion as a system of beliefs. 27 
The policy with the most far-reaching effects was the Past or Covenant of Umar. 
According to A. S. Tritton, the scholar who has done to this day the most in-depth work 
on this agreement is that the Pact of Umar is a collection of norms dealing with 
management of the Non-Muslim minorities attribute to Umar of which there were several 
and some of whom were caliphs. According to Tritton, “the conclusion forced on one is 
that no one knew what the covenant of Umar was; and that any collection of peace terms 
might be glorified with his name.” 28 However,  for the most part  the stipulations came 
originally from the treaties concluded between the Muslims and the cities and garrisons 
that the  Muslim armies  conquered in the seventh century in the time of the second 
caliph, ‘Umar I (634-644); hence the name of the compilation of these and later 
stipulations.  
Some claim that the Pact was also named for caliph Umar ibn Abd al- Aziz’s 
(717-720). His program, for the most part, was aimed at promoting the equality of all 
Muslims, be they Arab conquerors or new converts to Islam,29 yet, socially speaking, it 
had a significant impact Christians living under the caliphs’ rule. The Pact or Covenant  
of Umar  drew visible, and well-articulated, public distinctions between Muslims and 
non-Muslims in terms of power, access, prestige, and privilege. Historically, after the 
conquest and the consolidation of Islamic rule in the conquered territories, this pact 
gradually came into being to govern and enforce the laws that mandated a low social 
profile for Christians, Jews and others who paid the tax According to the pact, protected 
peoples—i.e., Jews and Christians—acquired the privilege to worship, to own property, 
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and to pursue their occupations in return for acknowledging the authority of the Muslim 
government, swearing loyalty to the Muslim state, and paying the jizya as well as any 
other financial assessments. In addition, the pact prohibited Christians and Jews from 
marrying Muslim women and making any public religious display, such as exhibiting 
imagery, ringing bells, making processions, issuing proclamations, and undertaking new 
construction or repairs on synagogues or churches. Jews and Christians could not 
proselytize, teach the Qur’an, nor prevent family members from converting to Islam. 
Dhimmis could not imitate Muslims in appearance, bury their dead in Muslim cemeteries, 
build homes that overlooked those of Muslims, own slaves previously owned by 
Muslims, hold political office, ride horses or camels, testify against a Muslim in a 
criminal legal case, sell alcohol, pork, or carrion to Muslims. In addition, Jews and 
Christians in some places were to identify themselves by wearing a girdle over external 
clothing, shaving the front of their head (males), and using distinctive headgear, saddles, 
and mounts.30  
One can certainly argue that considering the times, the degree of respect and 
toleration afforded non-Muslims as religious minorities in Muslim lands was much 
greater than that afforded non-Christians in Christian lands.  Even though the legal 
disabilities which governed these dhimmis required subservience, they received certain 
guarantees and protections not so available to others in the Christian West. Yet, while 
specifics have varied, there seems little doubt that in view of the stipulations of the Pact 
of Umar, the  dhimmi  populations of Christians in the Islamic world were what we would 
now call today second-class citizens, and as a consequence, over the course of time, the 
number of bishoprics, churches, monasteries and schools gradually decreased, as a result 
of a privileged position and priority given to official establishment of Islam. Syria, 
Palestine and Egypt, i.e., areas where the largest populations of the speakers of Arabic 
lived31 at the end of the ninth century, were still largely Christian; however,  under 
Muslim rule these populations gradually decreased. Some would say they converted, 
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others would say they succumbed.  It is clear, however, that in many respects, the slow 
erosion of Christian numbers had to do with motives other than purely spiritual or 
religious appeal. To a large extent, it had to do the practical advantages of the new 
religious identity that brought with it greater social status, upward mobility, and financial 
rewards.  These were positive incentives, yet negative incentives. The negatives and 
positives i.e., the application of the carrot or the stick varied according to time and place. 
For instance, after the time of the Crusades and the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth 
century, anti-Christian policies became more pronounced under the influence of rigorous 
and strict constructionists of the Covenant of Umar, like Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328)32. 
As negative incentives and sanctions were imposed, Christians began to decline 
precipitously in numbers in the Islamic world. Later, under the Ottomans and the 
implementation of the semi-autonomous millet system Christians lived with many more 
freedoms, independence and power—positive developments, which, as we shall see, are 
even today looked upon with some nostalgia.   
E. LEGAL STATUS OF CITIZENS 
The aforementioned Pact of Umar provided the dhimmi with a conditional 
indulgence to worship, to own property, and to pursue their occupations. In return, they 
were required to    acknowledge the authority of the Muslim government, and swore 
loyalty to the Muslim state. This still did not confer upon them the status of citizens. 
Indeed, the concept of citizen itself was not a category that existed. There were only 
Muslims and non-Muslims. Among the non-Muslims there were several categories, the 
most socially respected and socially useful were the dhimmis. According to Abdel Aziz 
Sachedina, “that the shar’iah has never developed the concept of citizenship,”33at least 
not in way that Western Europe did. Judges upheld the spirit of the Pact of Umar, if not 
always the letter, and often intervened in the affairs of the ta’ifa (sect) when they 
deemed it necessary to keep order and to protect the Islamic identity of society. 
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Christians and Jews possessed no inherent rights, could not give testimony against a 
Muslim in criminal cases, and were required to demonstrate their subservience in a 
variety of ways. 
It was during the Ottoman times, however, after the millet system came into being 
that a kind of citizenship developed wherein Christians and Jews were granted rights and 
privileges as long as they stayed within their circumscribed areas or milla. Bruce 
Masters’s study of the Ottoman Arab provinces has drawn attention to the paradoxical 
character of religious privilege and political subordination for Jews and Christians. The 
ahl al-dhimma acquired a measure of autonomy to form their distinct communities that 
ran parallel to the dominant Muslim one. This communal organization prefigured the 
more strictly controlled millet system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.34 
While functioning within the parameters of this semi-autonomous and  in some 
ways imagined sphere, the dhimmi achieved a kind of limited, indeed, legally mandated 
millet citizenship. If a Christian or Jew committed a crime against a member of another 
community, the law of the injured party applied.  However, any dispute involving a 
Muslim fell under their shari’ah−based law. However, the courts during Ottoman times 
practiced a kind of de-facto recognition of their dhimmi subjects, if not treating them as 
full citizens. Court records indicate that there were numerous cases throughout the 
Ottoman Empire of Jews and Christians who brought their cases to shari’ah courts  thus 
expressing confidence that they would mete out justice, which they usually did. 35  
Nevertheless, this did not imply equality: the Ottomans retained the same highly 
condescending attitude toward the ahl al-dhimma as their Arab predecessors.   According 
to Columbia University’s Karen Barkey, the hallmarks of the Ottoman millet system’s 
attitude towards its religious minorities is that they were to be “separate, unequal and 
protected”36 This approach to interfaith relations solidified a hierarchy of privilege that 
allowed Christians and Jews to maintain their religious identity, yet clearly demonstrated 
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 35 William Montgomery Watt, Muslim-Christian Encounters (New York: Routledge, 1991): 61.  
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the subordination of the ahl al-dhimma to Muslims in an Islamic culture.  Hence, as I 
mentioned, they were more subjects than citizens.   
During the Ottoman eighteenth century, vassal states and their political elites 
began to contest the Sublime Porte’s authority. Competition, military and commercial 
with European powers intensified eventually leading to the reform of existing institutions.  
In retrospect, we have come to understand that through a series of agreements and 
concessions to the British, French, and Russians in particular, the Ottoman Empire lost a 
measure of its sovereignty, and the millet leaders, such as the Greek and Coptic Orthodox 
patriarchs lost a measure of their ability to control the members of their flocks.  
The definition of who was a citizen was universalized by the Tanzimaat reforms. 
The sultan was valiantly trying to update and hold his empire together with a series of 
reforms that granted full Ottoman citizenship to all regardless of creed. Paradoxically, as 
“Ottomanness” became the new criteria for universal citizenship, we see a rise in real 
sectarianism, perhaps best epitomized by the mutasariffya administrative areas on Mount 
Lebanon.37  In 1856, Sultan Abd al-Majid (r. 1839–1861) issued the Hatt-i Humayun 
decree, conceding in principle the equality before the law of all the subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire regardless of religion It is true that in their thrust, the Tanzimaat reforms 
( both the Gulhane Rescript and Hatt i-Humayun)  broadened and extended the Ottoman 
identity and dismantled much of the basis for the old millet identities, however, because 
they were linked to the  Ottoman sultan’s “Capitulations”  and thus to European and 
Christian powers, they strengthened the relationship between the  empire’s religious 
minorities and its foreign patron states. This conferred upon the newly emerging non-
Muslim Ottomans a taint of “foreignness” and disloyalty even. The Russians presented 
themselves as formal protectors of Eastern Orthodox groups, the French of Roman 
Catholics, and the British of Jews and other groups. An Ottoman official in his memoirs 
wrote: 
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Foreign Powers ... take up, some of them, the cause of those eastern 
Christians who are under Ottoman rule, alleging they are acting in the 
name of ‘humanity.’ Their real motive, however, is that they may use 
them as a point d’appui for their political schemes and designs. . . each 
native Christian community entertains, nowadays more or less without 
disguise, sentiments of animosity towards the Osmanlis, and even 
sympathizes with the enemies of the Turkish empire in times of 
international trouble or war. 38 
As the Ottoman millet system of citizenship began to degrade, the identification 
of the religious creed with ethnic nationality was slipping. However, in Egypt, the ability 
of the sultans to effect policy was questionable already by the mid-eighteenth century. By 
the nineteenth century, things evolved towards even greater autonomy courtesy of 
Mohammed Ali Pasha.  The Copts’ position began to improve under the stability and 
tolerance of his dynasty. 39 H. B. Christophoros, a representative of the Greek Consulate, 
and a member of the Hellenic College teaching staff said the following:  
Mohammed Ali demonstrated his protection of the Greek Orthodox 
Patriarchate and its flock  (rayih) throughout the whole period of the 
revolution, both during the time of Ierotheos I and afterwards. On the one 
hand he did not cease to provide much material and moral protection to 
the Greek Orthodox people; and on the other hand, upholding the 
privileges of the Patriarch in matters relating to the management of the 
internal affairs of the Church. This was manifest both in his personal 
relations with the Church and in his favourable interpretation of the 
Firmans which were given by the Sultans after the election of the 
Patriarchs in recognition of them.”40 
As a result of the Crimean War (1853-56), the Copts saw the dawn of their 
emancipation. Their main mark of inferiority, the jizya tax, was lifted in 1855, and in the 
same year, they were allowed to join the army.  In 1866, the Copts served in the inaugural 
session of the Consultative Council, establishing a process of Coptic integration into the 
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Egyptian political system.  Ensured of their political rights, and freed from all social 
restraints, the Copts flourished. This Coptic civil revival was accompanied by a religious 
awakening, triggered by their enlightened Patriarch, Cyril IV (1854-1861), and it had the 
effect of raising their moral and educational standards, and a kindling re-discovery of 
their distinct identity. 
More illuminating was the Copts’ effort to reformulate the country’s 
communal guidelines and eliminate or minimize the role of religion in 
Egypt, as it was emerging from its Ottoman past. The most obvious option 
for a new community was one based on territorial nationalism—
”Egyptianness”—as distinct from a pan-Islamic or regional identity of any 
kind. Egyptian nationalism was born on the eve of World War I and 
became popular in the country during the struggle against foreign 
domination; Christian leaders were among its chief advocates and 
ideologues, as it was both consonant with the Coptic historical legacy and 
politically beneficial.41     
Copts now were employed in financial and accounting positions and were 
appointed rulers in a number of local governates. Copts had rights of land ownership and 
a large financial and commercial bourgeoisie developed. A lay council, the Majlis al-
Milli was created in 1874 to represent the Coptic community. Religious freedom and 
equality in employment were guaranteed in principle, though de-facto discrimination was 
still present. 
F.  GOVERNMENT/MILITARY SERVICE 
While many Christians and Jews reached positions of notable authority in the 
courts of the various caliphs and sultans, the real power of the state remained firmly in 
Muslim hands. Where Christians advanced en masse in the Islamic state began under the 
under the Ottoman Sultan, Murad II, wherein young Christian boys were recruited from 
among the conquered peoples of the Balkans to serve the state.  It was considered a 
system of human taxation and lasted from the fifteenth century until the nineteenth 
century.  These boys, however, though originally from Christian homes were raised as 
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Muslims. Known in Turkish as devshirme, it was much debated by Muslim scholars of 
the time and many considered it  to be contradictory to shari’ah. According to dissenting 
ulema, the shari’ah gave clear instructions to the Muslim ruler to protect and take care of 
all Christian subjects. These clerics noted that the shari`ah permitted enslavement only in 
Dar al-Harb, not Dar al-Islam, where Muslims ruled. However, the needs of the empire, 
as well as tribal traditions, apparently caused the rulers to find this practice irresistible. 
From the fifteenth until the seventeenth century, between 200,000 and 300,000 boys were 
conscripted into the devshirme. 
Already in operation at the end of the fourteenth century, it continued to 
evolve through the fifteenth] In the sixteenth century, when a levy was to 
be made the sultan’s ferman first appointed a commissioner and a 
janissary officer for each district. Under the supervision of the local qadi 
and sipahi, at each village the commission summoned all male children 
between the ages of eight and twenty, and their fathers, choosing those 
children who appeared to be fit. The levee included only the children of 
Christian villages engaged in agriculture, excluding urban children and 
any only child. The commission recorded each child’s name and 
description in a register and sent the boys in groups of a hundred to a 
hundred and fifty to the age of the Janissaries in Istanbul.  42 
 A tragedy for many, but some scholars note that for many later Ottoman Christian 
families, being the “slave” of the sultan was considered to be an honor by some, and 
these janissaries filled the most prestigious positions in society.  
Very often, becoming the sultan’s slave was the fastest way out of poverty 
for young boys in the countryside. There are some reports of Christian 
families glad for the opportunity to let their sons be selected through 
devishirme and be able to advance. 43 
Yet others, also modern scholars, contest the degree to which Christians 
viewed the conscription and conversion of their boys in such a benevolent light:44 
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…in discussing the devshirme we are dealing with the large numbers of 
Christians who, in spite of the material advantages offered by conversion 
to Islam, chose to remain members of a religious society which was 
denied first class citizenship. Therefore the proposition advanced by some 
historians, that the Christians welcomed the devshirme as it opened up 
wonderful opportunities for their children, is inconsistent with the fact that 
these Christians had not chosen to become Muslims in the first instance 
but had remained Christians…there is abundant testimony to the very 
active dislike with which they viewed the taking of their children.   
G. TAXATION 
According to the Pact of Umar, protected peoples—i.e., Jews and Christians—in 
exchange for the privilege to worship, to own property, and to pursue their occupations 
had to acknowledge the authority of the Muslim government, swearing loyalty to the 
Muslim state, and paying the jizya as well as any other financial assessments. 
Interestingly,   the change from Byzantine to Arab rule was welcomed by many among 
the dhimmis who found the new yoke far lighter than the old, both in taxation and in other 
matters. Some even among the Christians of Syria and Egypt preferred the rule of Islam 
to that of Byzantines.   
Taxation from the perspective of dhimmis who came under the Muslim rule was 
“a concrete continuation of the taxes paid to earlier regimes”45 and from the point of view 
of the Muslim conqueror, was a material proof of the dhimmis subjection. The 
importance of dhimmis as a source of revenue for the Muslim community is illuminated 
in a letter ascribed to Umar I and cited by Abu Yusuf: “if we take dhimmis and share 
them out, what will be left for the Muslims who come after us? By God, Muslims would 
not find a man to talk to and profit from his labors.”46      
In the first century following the Muslim conquest of Egypt, we see   the effects 
of taxation upon the Coptic majority. Large-scale conversions occurred that were closely 
linked to the disproportionate economic hardship inflicted upon the Christians. According 
to Goddard, “oppressive taxation led to a whole series of revolts in different regions of 
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Egypt between 725/107 and these were crushed by the local governors and, in the end, 
the caliph al-Ma’mun himself, who visited the province in 832/217.”47While modern 
commentators wonder, how, given the level of intentionality and “jihad” by economic 
means that the Coptic community was able to resist at all, it is important to note that 
taxation alone did not cause mass conversions- it was a combination of taxation and 
military aggression. Ira Lapidus commented that: 
Coptic resistance by force of arms was broken. The despair which 
followed these crushing defeats seems finally to have set in train the 
movement of mass conversions to Islam... We may say that the defeat of 
the rebellion broke the backbone of mass Coptic allegiance to 
Christianity.48 
Later, other heavily Christian areas, particularly in  the Ottoman lands  
experienced a similar pattern of conversions. However, for those that remained Christian 
or Jewish the Ottomans came to develop the millets wherein the ahl al dhimma lived 
within a semi-autonomous community which actually acquired a great deal of power. 
They set their own laws and collected and distributed their own taxes.  However, dhimmis 
still had to carry a receipt certifying their payment of jizya at all times or be subject to 
imprisonment. According to Norman Stillman, the “jizya and kharaj were a crushing 
burden for the non-Muslim peasantry who eked out a bare living in a subsistence 
economy.” 49 A number of scholars have concluded that, ultimately, the additional 
taxation was a critical factor that drove many dhimmis to accept Islam.50However, others, 
such as Bernard Lewis argues that while dhimmis had to pay higher taxes, they did not 
have to pay zakat and Lewis notes that “there are varying opinions among scholars as to 
how much of an additional burden the jizya actually was.” 51 
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H.  CHURCH BUILDING AND REPAIR 
The regulations about church building and repair, once enshrined in the Pact of 
Umar, prove durable over time. These rules prevented Christians and Jews from 
undertaking new construction or repairs on synagogues or churches in many locations, 
stipulating that dhimmis not “build a church, convent, hermitage or cell, nor repair those 
that are dilapidated,”  52  Sometimes, dhimmis  managed to expand churches and 
synagogues and even build new ones, albeit at the price of bribing local officials in order 
to get permissions.  When non-Muslim houses of worship were built in cities founded 
after the Islamic conquests, Muslim jurists usually justified such evasions of the Islamic 
law by claiming that those churches and synagogues had existed in the earlier 
settlements. Later, depending on the locale, the permission for dhimmis to retain their 
places of worship and build new ones depended upon the circumstances in which the land 
fell under the Muslim rule. The policy varied based on local relations and the degree of 
tolerance of the ruler and the usefulness of the Christians to the ruler. 
From a modern sociological standpoint, the ease and ability given to the 
Christians to restore their religious buildings, can be interpreted as a measure of  the 
degree  of religious freedom accorded to the ahl al-kitab by a Muslim state.  For example, 
in observance of this prohibition, Abbasid caliphs, al-Mutawakkil, al-Mahdi and  Harun 
al-Rashid ordered the destruction of all churches and synagogues built after the Islamic 
conquest and prohibited their rebuilding.  Yet, an historian of the Shi’a Fatimids at the 
Ismaili Center of London narrates that  “al Mu’izz has been credited with granting 
permission for the restoration of the church of al-Mu’allaka at Fustat. Interestingly, this 
action of the imam-caliph aroused some opposition, particularly from a Sunni cleric, who 
vowed to die rather than allow the church to be repaired.”53 Could this mean that the 
Shi’a had a more tolerant way of managing relations with the  ahl al dhimma?  Before we 
move to the conclusion, we should also consider that in the eleventh century, the Fatimid 
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(Shi’a) caliph al-Hakim oversaw over the demolition of all churches and synagogues in 
Egypt, Syria and Palestine, including the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem. 
Although, al-Hakim subsequently allowed the rebuilding of the destroyed buildings, his 
actions contributed to the launching of the first Crusade.     
I. RELIGIOUS PRACTICES 
 According to the Pact of Umar, Jews and Christians could not proselytize, teach 
the Qur’an, prevent family members from converting to Islam, imitate Muslims in 
appearance, bury their dead in Muslim cemeteries, build homes that overlooked those of 
Muslims, own slaves previously owned by Muslims, hold political office, ride horses or 
camels, testify against a Muslim in a criminal legal case, sell alcohol, pork, or carrion to 
Muslims. The Pact of Umar prohibited Christians and Jews from marrying Muslim 
women. In addition, Jews and Christians were to identify themselves by wearing a girdle 
over external clothing, shaving the front of their head (males), and using distinctive 
headgear, saddles, and mounts and making any public religious display, such as 
exhibiting imagery, ringing bells, making processions, and issuing religious 
proclamations.  
 In practice these measures, which seem draconian, were often impractical and had 
to be loosened. In Egypt, particularly under the Shi’a Fatimids, we hear that in 977, the 
second year of al ‘Aziz’s reign, a decree was issued which prohibited the Christians from 
participating in the rituals of Epiphany and hour years he forbade the Christians from 
celebrating the festival of the Cross-measure seemingly to fall completely in line with the 
Pact of Umar. However, these prohibitions were not a permanent ban on the celebration 
of religious festivals by the Christians. In fact, “the very next year they were granted 
permission to celebrate the Festival of the Cross again.” 54 These policies were 
implemented to uphold public mores and address episodic moral laxity. 
A combination of religious privilege and political subordination characterized the 
relationship between minority communities and their Ottoman overlords. Bruce Masters 
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has argued that even though Muslims and non-Muslims interacted with one another 
extensively, Jewish and Christian communities were disconnected from public 
“consciousness,” and “existed outside the boundaries of the social community.” 55 
Authorities enforced the principle that non-Muslim religious expression could not 
impinge upon the Muslim public sphere in any way. Christians and Jews were not to 
disturb Muslim sensibilities with the sights, sounds, and smells of rival faiths. Prohibition 
of public preaching, symbolism, processions, construction of new sacred spaces, and 
propagation of the faith outside the family banished Jewish and Christian communities 
from the public realm and placed them on the periphery of Ottoman society. Laws 
governing relations between Islam, Christianity, and Judaism assumed that the ahl al-
dhimma ought not under any circumstances to disturb Muslims’ peace of mind. Officials 
took special notice of non-Muslims when they intruded upon the Islamic public order. 56 
Regardless of time or place, in terms of religious practices, it was in the public 
domain where the Muslim concern for public order brought to bear the force of local 
edicts developed on the basis of the overarching legal and moral touchstone of maslaha 
mursala i.e., public good/welfare. Christians were largely left to their own devices to 
perform their devotions as they pleased in private or in the confines of the sanctuary of 
the church.  
J.  COMMUNAL REPRESENTATION 
The aforementioned discussion of subject and citizens of semi- autonomous 
sectarian communities leads naturally into the issue of community representation. Again, 
the Ottoman system offers the most well-developed example of religious leaders who 
fulfilled a dual role- that of spiritual and political leaders. Jews and Christians obtained 
the right to select their own leaders and resolve their own disputes. In the absence of what 
we understand as public services, each religious community became responsible for 
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creating, maintaining, and financing its own schools, charitable agencies, and clerical 
bureaucracies. These rights and responsibilities formed the basis of an informal 
understanding in the early modern period and that would later become formalized (and 
more detailed) in the millet system of the nineteenth century. The millet system accorded 
religious communities a large measure of self-regulation in exchange for loyalty to the 
Ottoman state. 
Indeed, the millet system of Ottoman Islamic law has been called a “pre-modern 
model of a religiously pluralistic society.”57  The millets had the right to choose their 
own religious leaders (patriarchs for Christians, exilarchs and geonim for Jews) but only 
as subject to the approval of the Muslim authorities, who sometimes blocked candidates 
or took the side of the party that offered the larger bribe. The head of millet was most 
often a religious hierarch such as the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople, who 
reported directly to the Ottoman Sultan. The millet leader held office at the discretion of 
the government, but was elected by the community and was a recognized intermediary 
between the two, combining in his own person the headship of a voluntary rayah  (lit: 
flock) and the status of an Ottoman official. The special function thus assigned to the 
patriarchates conferred upon the millets, as an institution, an ecclesiastical-political 
character. This meant that in the Middle East, a church i.e., an ecclesial body evolved into 
the most visible and public aspect of a nationality and the authority of the patriarchates, 
extend to the control of schools, and even to the administration of certain branches of 
civil law. 
K. CONVERSIONS AND APOSTASY 
Modern scholarship, particularly much of that which has been generated by 
Muslim scholars residing and working in Western academia, suggests that early in the life 
of the ummah, Muslim jurists illegitimately interpreted holy texts and manipulated 
hermeneutical-juridical tools to allow the state to institutionalize the inferior treatment of 
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non-Muslims. For the militant, and those extreme in their politics as well as their piety, it 
was easy to espouse a commonly held belief that “true” Islam meant “intolerance toward 
individual conscience.” 58While  they were not unaware that the Qur’an, in its teaching, 
favored free choice of religion, the drive to obtain a secure and orderly society was also 
an important part of the Qur’anic ethos and one which the caliph and his jurists privileged 
in  terms of social ethics. Thus, we see that a harsh treatment of apostates develop, 
generally based on a reading through the prism of the traditions as narrated in the 
Medinan period. Muslims who turned away from Islam were seen as not just rejecting it 
theologically, but also politically. Apostasy, then, was regarded as a form of treason at 
the very worst or insubordination and a threat to public order at very best. As Sachedina 
notes, in this historical context, the ulema’s attempt to balance the freedom of the 
individual conscience and concern for the public order was  unsuccessful: the jurists 
opted largely for ruling that meted out  a harsh punishment for apostates, justified 
because it was no longer a mere matter of belief; it was an act of sedition: 
As long as apostasy remains a private matter and does not disrupt the 
society at large, there is no particular punishment in the Qur’an. However, 
when it violates sanctity and impinges on the rights of Muslims to practice 
their belief, then it is treated as a physical aggression towards the faith. At 
that point it is no mere apostasy; it is, rather, treated as an act of sedition 
that causes discord and threatens the unity of Islamic community. 59 
Hugh Goddard in his book A History of Christian –Muslim Relations notes that 
there were never conversions en masse from by Muslim to Christianity, as there was by 
Christians to Islam. While the door for those who wanted to convert to Islam was open 
while for those who wanted to leave Islam remained firmly shut.  When conversions 
occurred they were done in very low-profile way. However, there were a few public 
conversion of prominent Muslim during the imperial period. Sheik Salih, an Indian alim, 
converted in 1825  became an Anglican priest, and Muhammed Mansur, a cleric of al- 
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Azhar, publicly embraced Christianity in 1919.60  Much ado was made of such 
conversions by the English and the evangelical press of the time. Given the political 
circumstances and the imperial presence of Great Britain, it is understandable how much 
safer and advantageous a conversion to Christianity was at that particular time in that 
situation.  However, in most places and times, for the common Muslim to convert to 
Christianity meant near social suicide. While there are cases of Muslims, converting to 
Christianity, most of these who did so, did so clandestinely. Even in the absence of 
formal punishment, rejection, censure, sanction and social stigmatization were all forms 
of social pressure  brought by the Muslim community, if not the Muslim authorities upon 
those who opted out of the ummah. 
L. SUMMARY  
Obviously, even this cursory attempt at identifying the more salient aspects of the 
historical record indicates that the treatment of non-Muslims was universally not the 
same at all times and in all places. Certain norms, because they surfaced with regularity 
and were intentionally and systemically sustained, albeit with some variation, allows me 
to assert that along these general lines differential treatment was the norm. Within each of 
these categories, specific practices and application of norms varied, however.  The 
contours of the discourse and the overarching ethos remain clear as they express 
continuity with the greater Islamic legal tradition, less in terms of ibadat (worship) and 
more in the area of mu’amalat (practices or social actions). For the purposes of historical 
comparison then, I identify elements that reflect not just the letter of the law that 
regulated the dhimmi communities, but also the spirit. As Bernard Weiss observes in his 
book, The Spirit of Islamic Law “ if  the law was in some measure more an ideal than a  
social reality, then it was a solidly institutionalized ideal firmly woven into the fabric  of 
Muslim thought. But it was not just an ideal; it was in a very large measure a social 
reality.”61 
                                                 
60 Op Cit, Goddard, 135. 




In summary, the areas of social and legal reality that historically characterize the 
contours of the dhimmi experience, and with which I will make my comparison are: 
religion’s constitutional relationship to the state, the legal status of citizen 
government/military service, taxation, church building and repair, regulation of religious 
practices, communal representation, and freedom of religion, particularly the right to 
convert away from Islam. As Weiss, notes all of these elements fall within at least one of 
the four main, enduring areas of consideration, wherein to this day according to shari’ah, 
the public authority can intrude upon the lives of individuals for “the collection of taxes, 
the regulation of the behaviour of people in public places, and the recruitment of persons 
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III. THE CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE IN EGYPT TODAY 
A. DEMOGRAPHICS 
The Christian community of Egypt numbers close to 12 percent of the population 
and, with its own auto-cephalous orthodox church, has a long history of engagement with 
the Islamic world, dating from the seventh century.  They are proportionately most 
numerous in Upper Egypt. Most Copts are working class peasants and laborers, although 
there is a Coptic business upper class and a middle class of urban professionals and small 
landowners. Copts are present in most institutions of the state, and there are Coptic 
members of all registered political parties. Other Christian communities include the 
Armenian Apostolic, Catholic (Armenian, Chaldean, Greek, Melkite, Roman, and Syrian 
Catholic), Maronite, and Orthodox (Greek and Syrian) churches, which range in size 
from several thousand to hundreds of thousands.  
An evangelical Protestant community, established in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, includes 16 Protestant denominations (Presbyterian, Episcopal (Anglican), 
Baptist, Brethren, Open Brethren, Revival of Holiness (Nahdat al-Qadaasa), Faith (Al-
Eyman), Church of God, Christian Model Church (Al-Mithaal Al-Masihi), Apostolic, 
Grace Pentecostal, Apostolic Grace, Church of Christ, Gospel Missionary (and the 
Message Church of Holland (Ar-Risaala)). There are also followers of the Seventh-Day 
Adventist Church, which was granted legal status in the 1960s. There are 800 to 1200 
Jehovah’s Witnesses and small numbers of Mormons, but the government does not 
recognize either group.63 
The Muslim population of Egypt is roughly 88 percent of the total and is 
overwhelmingly Sunni. In terms of the Islamic world, Egypt has produced great scholars 
and leaders and is the site of al-Azhar, the oldest and most prominent Sunni legal and 
religious institution in the Islamic world. Due to Egypt’s history as a center of gravity in 
the Muslim world and because in many ways it stands at a crossroads between East and 
                                                 
63 United States Department of State, 2008 Report on International Religious Freedom – Egypt,  
September 19, 2008: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48d5cbebc.html (accessed August 18, 2009). 
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West, President Barack Obama chose Cairo as the location for his recent address to the 
Muslim world.  Thus, Egypt currently affords the opportunity to study a moment in time 
in which contemporary Christian and Muslim leaders and their communities are engaging 
each other, not in a vacuum, but in a milieu in which significant political and social 
currents swirl about them.  
B.  REFERENCES TO THE DHIMMI ANALOGY 
On a steamy Cairo morning in the summer of 2007, I stood in front of typical 
nineteenth century villa tucked into the side streets of the fashionable neighborhood of 
Zamalek, an island in the middle of the Nile. I waited patiently while the houseboy 
fumbled with his heaving iron keys and opened the gate. He led me down a garden 
footpath and into a cool and spacious room with vaulted ceilings: the antechamber of the 
offices a leading Catholic prelate.  A large picture of Pope Benedict XIV hung on the 
wall. In that way, it was not much different from any other embassy, where a smiling 
portrait of the head of state is prominently displayed. A few minutes later, I was ushered 
into the prelate’s offices.  This senior clergyman, with piercing blue eyes and a gentle, 
even wistful demeanor,   asked me several questions about my studies and my research. 
After chasing a cup of thick, Arabic coffee with a glass of cold water and lemon juice, he 
proceeded to respond to my questions about the general state of Christian-Muslim 
relations in Egypt. I was given to understand that he saw relations between the 
communities in a state of general decline. The monsignor provided me with many 
valuable insights into the various issues that affected relations between Christians and 
Muslims, not just in Egypt, but worldwide, and also not just among the elites, but also on 
the street. Soon, we began to get into the meat of the matter and the main area of my 
research, the effect of increased Islamization in upon relations between the Muslim 
majority and the Christian, largely Coptic Orthodox minority.   
I found a general perception among Christian and Muslim Egyptians, as well as 
foreigners who have lived here or visit here regularly, that Egyptian society over the 
course of the last twenty years has been undergoing a slow process of Islamization. 
However, their definitions of Islamization were not always clear to me, nor were the 
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metrics that they applied to come to this conclusion. Some simply based their opinion on 
the increased number of women donning the headscarf and the niqab, or measured 
Islamization by attendance at Friday prayer, or an increase in Islamic bookstores, or the 
number of building permits issued for new mosque construction. Others insisted that 
Islamization had much less to do with religiosity and much more to do with the degree to 
which Islam had penetrated  the social, educational, economic, military, and political 
structures previously considered to be secular. Others, still unsatisfied with such a 
definition, insisted that one had to distinguish between different degrees and types of 
Islamization. They posited that some phenomena related to this apparent Islamization 
were authentic and natural consequences of living in a Muslim-majority society and thus, 
were fairly benign. They considered that other manifestations that embraced ideologies 
and practices that were oppressive, discriminatory, and intolerant as more dangerous and 
worthy or rejection.    
Eventually such discussions revolved around the inclusion or continued exclusion 
in the political process of the most prominent and well established of the Islamist groups, 
i.e., the Muslim Brotherhood. The, participation of candidates  affiliated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the summer 2007  Majlis al Shura Parliamentary elections, and the arrest 
of several of its members stimulated discussion in the press, on the street, and also among 
the Christian and Muslim elites. Yet, aside from recognizing its effectiveness as a 
movement of the opposition, it seemed difficult for Egyptians, even those sympathetic to 
the Islamist cause, to articulate the most precise and up-to-date position of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  This perhaps was due in part to the fact that the group and its leadership 
have evolved over  the years, but few could explain the Brotherhood’s position in matters 
related to co-existence with non-Muslims, such as full implementation of shari’ah, (a 
cornerstone of MB ideology) conversion from Islam, citizenship, the jizya tax, or church 
building and restoration. In discussing the Muslim Brotherhood’s longstanding desire to 
see a full application of shari’ah, the monsignor expressed a sanguine concern for the 




The return to dhimmi status would be a possibility. Nevertheless, there are 
different discourses inside the MB. ‘We are all one,’ say some… and some 
say “this Egypt is for all.” Some say the Christians should not be 
considered as a minority.  It is similar to the Coptic discourse rejecting the 
minority status, but in regard to Islam being the solution, the government 
is throwing people in jail for saying this.64 
I recall walking away from the interview, grateful for the many profound insights 
that the monsignor had provided. In all that we had discussed, what struck me the most 
were his multiple references, such as the one cited above, to the past dhimmi experience 
of the Christians community. It was not so much the simple reference to a historical fact 
as  it was with the way he seemed to deploy it to frame his concerns about the future of 
Christian-Muslim relations. I found that this way of retrieving the past, to create an 
analogy to the present and the future was to repeat itself over and over again, both in the 
press and in conversation. Copts, especially by means of the international media, and 
blogosphere drew attention to current levels of violence and discrimination against their 
fellows. The Christians perceived aspects of the Egyptian constitution itself as expressing 
the ethos and spirit, if not the name of “dhimmitude.” 
Apart from the scores of violent attacks against them over the past 35 
years, they have been forced into a de-facto dhimmi status.  In fact, the 
infamous Second Article of the Constitution provides the legal basis to 
discriminate against and marginalize the Copts in their own homeland. 65 
Moreover, this particular historical parallel, first articulated by the good 
monsignor, had traction. Indeed, comparisons to the dhimmi experience, sometimes 
accompanied by citations from the Qur’an and the hadith, injunctions from the Pact of 
Umar or firmans from Ottoman period, were drawn and seemed a standard part of many 
of my interlocutor’s rhetorical repertoires, so much so that it seemed to be taken for 
granted that the past conditions were completely comparable to the present ones.   
                                                 
 64 G. Martin, unpublished personal interview with senior Roman Catholic clergyman, Cairo, May 29, 
2007. 
 65 Adel Guindy, “The Islamization of Egypt,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 10, no. 3, 
Article 7/10,  September 2006).  
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Ali Gomaa, the Grand Mufti of Egypt whom I interviewed, waved off complaints 
that Christians were being discriminated against and asserted that the current conditions 
for Christians were much improved and that they had many more rights than ever before. 
He nevertheless, cited as his benchmark, the treatment of Christians during the Ottoman 
period when they were considered dhimmis. The Grand Mufti dismissed the violence and 
discrimination against Christians as episodic and not systemic, echoing the government’s 
stance that Christians long ago acquired full citizenship. 
…in terms of Shari’ah law being the law of the land, Christians need to 
reflect upon their experience here. What has been their position? They did 
not complain when under the Ottomans there was the Shari’ah. 
Afterwards, under the Ottomans they complained about the millet laws 
dealing with dhimmis and these laws were eliminated. We said “what 
don’t you like” and they told us and we said, “fine, you want freedom 
from this? Then you are free” 66     
However, there are other Muslim voices, official ones, too, that do not share the 
Grand Mufti’s perspective of equanimity. The official website of the Supreme Council 
for Islamic Affairs, an official body of the “Ministry of Awqaf,” (The Ministry of 
Endowment and Islamic Affairs)  posted an article entitled “Islam versus Ahl al-Kitab: 
Past and Present.”  The author, Dr. Maryam Jameelah, attempts to answer the question 
“how can we be certain that Islam is the only infallible Truth?” The article concludes by 
emphatically stating:  
Peaceful relations and mutual respect among us can only be achieved 
through strength. We must cease indulging in apologetics and present the 
Islamic message to the world honestly and forthrightly. Before we can hope 
to succeed with Tabligh (proselytizing) on a large scale, we must first 
convert the nominal Muslims into true believers. We must establish a full-
blooded Islamic state where the world will witness our precepts translated 
into action. Finally, we must crush the conspiracies of Zionism, free-
masonry, Orientalism and foreign missions both with the pen and with the 
sword. We cannot afford peace and reconciliation with the Ahl al Kitab 
until we can humble them and gain the upper hand. 67 
                                                 
 66  Op Cit, Ali Gomaa, in G. Martin.  
67  Maryam Jameelah, “Islam versus Ahl al-Kitab: Past and Present,” Supreme Council of Islamic 
Affairs, Arab Republic of Egypt, http://www.islamic-council.com/non-muslims_u/Chapter3.asp. (accessed 
October 20, 2009).  
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Yet, even within this same organization there shades of opinion. I was able to 
interview an even more senior spokesman from the very same Supreme Council for 
Islamic Affairs, who sought to harmonize relations between Muslims and Christians, 
claiming that equanimity is within the true spirit and teachings of Islam. This official 
spokesman (a former Muslim Brother) seemed to me most disinclined to “humble” the 
dhimmi. Rather, with regards to treatment of non-Muslims, he argued for retrieval and 
application of the true spirit of the Qur’an—a spirit, according to him was illegitimately 
bent and twisted by the early jurists to facilitate domination of conquered peoples. 
For me there is no contradiction, but the way you apply the law and the 
sort of application are two different things.  It has to do with the education 
of Muslims on how to deal with non-Muslims. If you apply correctly and 
honestly the Qur’an, they are protected and have same rights.  The Qur’an 
is educational.  So it comes down to a problem of culture. Toleration is 
found in texts of all monotheistic traditions. 68 
The man who introduced me to the senior spokesman of the Supreme Council for 
Islamic Affairs, is one of the senior-most Anglican leaders in the Middle East and Egypt. 
In giving voice to the inchoate distrust and fears of his flock, he, too, deployed the dhimmi 
analogy as a way of characterizing his imagined vision of the future—a future, he was 
convinced, was to be one of oppression if the Islamists were to come to power: 
If the Muslim Brotherhood came to power or any Islamists, we would  
immediately become dhimmis. If Muslims would like to affirm the 
citizenship rights of minorities, then they should put aside religion, and the 
Muslim Brotherhood will never put aside religion. They cannot put aside 
religion. 69  
Before one dismisses this senior Christian clergyman’s fears as unfounded, one 
should contemplate the following statement of a prominent and widely read Shaykh 
Ahmed al-Mahalawi, who is popular with the Islamists. One can infer from Shaykh al-
Mahalawi’s comments that he is quite familiar with the scriptural justification for 
humbling the ahl al-dhimma. 
                                                 
 68 G. Martin,  unpublished personal interview with senior spokesman of the Supreme Council for 
Islamic Affairs, Cairo, May 25,  2007.  
 69 G. Martin, unpublished  personal interview with senior Anglican leader, Cairo, August 22,  2007.  
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Before this Friday sermon, an official of the Religious Endowments 
Ministry came and gave me a paper containing instructions to preach on 
Islamic tolerance towards dhimmis. I protested against such dictates but I 
readily tackled the subject. Verily Islam is, and has always been, tolerant 
with regard to dhimmis, yet on the condition that they know their place.”70      
Depending on whom I was interviewing, the comparison, regardless of whether or 
not one sees it as valid or spurious, was sometimes viewed in a favorable light in and 
other times in a negative light.  Whether they were holding up the treatment of Christians 
as dhimmi as an example, par excellence of Muslim toleration, or decrying it as obsolete 
in the light of modern ideas of citizenship and human rights, I found it noteworthy that 
the Qur’anic concept of dhimmi status provided many with the cognitive template, the 
model, and the standard by which they measured contemporary Christian-Muslim 
relations. Moreover, I sensed that there was a general consensus that, given perception of 
intensity and speed with which Islamization was proceeding, people believed that history 
could someday be repeated.  Some welcomed that day, and some feared it. 
C.  CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE OF GRIEVANCE 
During the liberal period of the early twentieth century and the fight for Egyptian 
sovereignty form the British, the topic of minority rights and treatment of the Egyptian 
Christian minority appeared to be studied as a relic, and a curiosity, of an artifact of a 
now obsolete system.  In 1907, the Copts demonstrated a great faith in the national effort 
by joining the pro-Islamic al-Watani movement to call for the removal of the British 
occupation. However, party leadership and party goals changed to promote strict Islamic 
policies, causing prominent Copts to leave al-Watani party leadership.  Many moderate 
Muslims and Christians formed the al-Ummah movement in order to promote national 
unity.   The Party succeeded in defining the Egyptian identity as separate from the 
Ottoman identity.  Despite this, Coptic-Muslim relations continued to suffer under the 
combined strain of British rule and pro-Islamic Khedival policies. In 1911, a Coptic 
conference was organized under the leadership of the Bishop of Asyout in reaction to the 
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assassination of Boutros Ghali, the Prime Minister and a Coptic Christian.  At the 
conference, public demands were made for Coptic rights, and immediately, an Islamic 
sectarian response developed. Undeterred by this Islamist tilt, in the three decades 
following the end of the First World War—often referred to as the Arab liberal age—
Christians worked side by side, under the revolutionary egalitarianism promoted by Sa’ad 
Zaghloul.  
A political party was born of this movement, known as the Wafd party. It 
‘stressed the unity and equality of all Egyptians, Muslims, or Christians, 
and several Copts played important roles in the party, alongside Muslims, 
in trying to obtain independence for Egypt after the war’71 
Christians and Muslims struggled together against the British occupation and did, 
in fact, secure rights of citizenship that came close, but did not equal that of their Muslim 
counterparts. In 1920, the British resorted to the old tactics of divide and conquer by 
appointing a Copt as Prime Minister. The British tried to separate Copts and Muslims, 
attempting to isolate Copts from the nationalist movement by inciting sectarian strife. In a 
show of unity over 2,000 Copts met at the Greater Marcossia church to protest the British 
machinations. One Copt even attempted to assassinate the Copt nominated for Prime 
Minister, Yousef Wahbeh. The outcry against the British attempt to pit Christian against 
Muslim backfired to the extent that most Copts strove even harder to demonstrate their 
commitment to national unity, even at the expense of their own possible promotion in 
government. With this nationalist mindset, the Copts went on to baffle the British even 
further by opposing the British proposal to include a provision for religious minorities in 
the 1923 constitution.  
The two communities began protesting together and brandished banners 
with the Islamic crescent and the Christian cross inter-twined. Likewise, 
Muslim shaykhs and Coptic priests were not afraid to share pulpits, both 
proclaiming to their congregations that they held a common link both 
spiritual and essentially Egyptian72  
 
                                                 
 71 P. Doorn-Harder,  Contemporary Coptic Nuns (Columbia, S.C., University of South Carolina Press, 
1995): 21. 
 72 Op Cit. Hasan, 36. 
49 
 
Copts also sided with Arabs in the conflict with Israel in the 1940s, but when 
Arabs demonstrated violently against Jewish settlement in Palestine, Copts, still unable to 
convince the Muslim majority of their loyalty to the national unity of the Egyptian state, 
fell victim to political abuse and physical assault. Still, Copts were appointed governors, 
ministers of foreign affairs, even prime ministers. During that period, the close affinity 
between the crescent and the cross reflected the popular motto: ‘Religion is the province 
of Allah and the homeland is for all.’ All in all, despite some significant low points, the 
period from the 1919 revolution through the fall of King Farouk has been considered the 
pinnacle of Coptic integration, with two Coptic prime ministers during this period and 
widespread political participation of Coptic MPs, a Copts at high levels in a variety of 
government posts and in the media. 
Not long after WWII, things shifted. As the late French Protestant Professor 
Jacques Ellul put it, “that which was related to Islam and the Muslim world was believed 
to belong to a past that, if not dead, was certainly no more alive than medieval 
Christianity… And then, suddenly, since 1950, everything changed completely.”73   After 
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 1952 coup, Copts were gradually largely excluded from the top 
echelons of political and administrative bodies.  The revolution in 1952 brought in 
nationalization and agricultural reform. While middle and lower class Copts benefited, as 
did their Muslim counterparts,  the Coptic elite lost 75 per cent of their property through 
nationalization; Until that moment,  the Christians  had dominated a major share of the 
economy. Nasser also issued two decrees that had implications for Copts: one enforcing 
religion as a basic subject in the curricula rather than complementary to it, and a second 
decree which put entrance into al-Azhar University off limits to non-Muslim students. 
Also, Nasser abolished political parties with significant Coptic membership, like the 
Wafd Party. He seized Coptic Church endowments in 1957 and limited  landholding by 
any Copt to 200 acres. This began a serious deterioration in the status of Copts and 
provoked the first wave of twentieth century emigration of Copts. 
                                                 
73 Jacques Ellul, in preface to  Ye’or, Bat, Les Chretiens d’Orient Entre Jihad et Dhimmitude: VIIe-
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Under Sadat, social frustrations mounted in the 1970s with the rise of Islamic 
radical movements, strikes and protests, Sadat courted the Islamists as a foil to counter 
the left. Like the British, Sadat, too, politicized religion to gain allies and revived or at 
best acquiesced to Islamist animosity towards the Copt. Islamic groups became 
increasingly organized and violent. In 1972 Coptic churches, houses and shops were 
burnt as  Copts reacted to the increasingly discriminatory laws.  
Sadat, in currying favor with the Muslim Brotherhood, and to pacify militant 
Islamists had parliament amend the constitution whereby the shari’ah became the basic 
source of legislation. This amendment remains on the books until this day, and I will 
discuss at greater length below under “religion’s constitutional relationship to the state.” 
Confrontations escalated in 1978 and 1979 and culminated in 1980 with Sadat accusing 
Pope Shenouda III of involvement in a plot to undermine state security. The Pope was 
placed under house arrest and exiled to a desert monastery, while 125 Coptic activists 
were arrested. Coptic associations were banned and all Coptic publishing concerns were 
closed down. By signing the peace treaty with Israel, Sadat succeeded in infuriating many 
of radical Muslims he had so earnestly courted. In 1981, he was gunned down by Islamist 
militants. Under Mubarak, the Pope, who had been kept muzzled for four years was freed 
to circulate in 1985. But as economic recession deepened, violence against Copts flared 
up and has continued to do so sporadically, and in many cases, unpredictably up to the 
present day. Below we will now describe element-by-element, the present Christian 
condition based on the same hallmarks of the historical dhimmi experience identified in 
chapter three. 
D.  RELIGION AND THE STATE   
As mentioned above, in the early part of the twentieth century, Egypt 
experimented with a more secular government that allowed near equal access to power by 
both Muslims and Copts, yet the relationship never could be considered a full separation 
of Mosque and State. The government grants legal status to only the three “heavenly 
religions,” i.e., Islam, Christianity, and Judaism and, as we will see in the subsequent 
section, this constitution recognition of these three faiths has an impact of the personal 
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status of individual citizens. Constitutionally, a useful way of understanding the 
relationship of religion to the Egyptian state is to study the role played by Al-Azhar. Al-
Azhar provides a mirror that reflects the tension and the degree of cooperation between 
the state and the religious establishment. Traditionally, the head of al-Azhar  held a 
position of legitimacy in the eyes of the people. He was seen as a de-facto, not just de-
jure leader. Therefore, what the head of al-Azhar decreed was usually accepted without 
questioning by many Muslims. There was no need for the state to place its imprimatur on 
al-Azhar. Indeed, it was more often the state that needed and looked for religious 
endorsement.  
As early as 1812, the state intervened to ensure it got the rulings it needed by 
appointing the Shaykh al-Azhar, and from 1895 to 1896 the aforementioned Abduh, 
representing the government, secured government salaries from al-Azhar clerics.  By 
1911, 62 percent of al-Azhar’s budget came from the government and reached 96 percent 
by 1959. The final fusion of the state and the ulema occurred when Nasser further 
nationalized al-Azhar in 1961. For some being co-opted by the state meant a loss in the 
ulema’s autonomy and explained its lack of prophetic voice, especially whenever it 
seemed to produce rulings that tended to support unpopular government positions.   
Nasser transformed al-Azhar  into the Academy of Islamic Research, and this academy, 
along with the positions of the mufti of Egypt, the minister of awqaf  (religious 
properties), and the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, since then have assisted the state 
with important issues of religious expression, and social control. Thus, since Nasser’s 
time, all positions at al-Azhar are filled by state appointees. When, in 1996,  Hosni 
Mubarak appointed Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi (b. 1928) as the Grand Imam, many 
protested his selection as a political choice, as he is a leading member of the religious 
faction of the National Democratic Party  that rules Egypt under Mubarak. 
While most modern day Egyptian Christians cannot remember a time when the 
government and the official Islamic establishment  were not in charge of all matters 
dealing with religions in the society, they have regarded the established mosque-state 
relationship between the government and al-Azhar as infinitely preferable to any Islamist 
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arrangements. In reality, the measure which appears to cause greater distress is the 
constitutional Status of Islamic Law, which, as of 1971, was returned to a place of 
prominence and later in 1980 officially amended by referendum by President Sadat. As a 
concession to Islamist sentiment, Sadat amended the constitution to establish Islamic law 
as the principal source of legislation in Egypt. Article Two of the Constitution since then 
reads in full: “Islam is the religion of the State and Arabic its official language. Islamic 
jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation.”  Thus, in terms of international 
agreements or human rights charters, there is inserted a correlated reference to Article 
Two, found in many pieces of international legislation, treaty or multilateral agreement to 
which Egypt is a party states that, although “Egypt is willing to comply with the content 
of said (article, agreement, accord)” it is with the proviso that “such compliance does not 
run counter to the Islamic shari’ah”74. Though Article Two is clear about Islam being the 
main source, (meaning there are no other civil or religious sources), the Egyptian legal 
system is actually still a hybrid. It is based on Islamic law together with civil law 
originating from nineteenth century French civil codes, but in terms of the legal traditions 
of other religious faiths, Islam remains constitutionally the sole source.  
Thus, like the constitutions of most nations, and even many Muslim nations, the 
Egyptian Constitution is the unique product of Egyptian history. In its structure, spirit and 
content it attempts to weave together into a coherent document, different legal and moral 
traditions. While it seems to have been successful to a remarkable extent in harmonizing 
and universalizing commonalities and reconciling differences, points of friction exist. 
Muslim legal minds, however, now tend to see the problems as largely solved, and very 
few accommodations or concessions are necessary.  The Grand Mufti believes that with 
minor modifications, the ethical principles found therein are both uniquely Egyptian and 
represents core values that are both religious and profoundly democratic:  
A careful, point-by-point comparison was made with Shari’ah law, not 
fiqh, but Shari’ah law, which is different. Here we speak of the Maqassid 
of the Sharia (the overall objectives of the Shari’ah ethical system) and I 
                                                 
 74The Emory Law School, “Islamic Family Law,” Legal History: 
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say that no one should be surprised that it was found that most of the 
French Civil Code was perfectly acceptable and could be related to its 
counterpart in the Shari’ah.  I have written twelve articles on this subject. 
Likewise, vice-versa, when the Shari’ah was compared to French Civil 
Code it was found acceptable with Western notions of democracy. Thus, I 
am in agreement with those who say that the liberal, democratic position is 
compatible with the shari’ah. The Egyptian constitution in making the 
Shari’ah the main source is embracing its universalities. (Kulliyaat) 
Twelve Islamic countries found themselves to be in agreement on this, i.e., 
that Egyptian Civil Law is recognizably based on usul al fiqh, i.e., 
Shari’ah, but again, not the direct application of fiqh…In general, then, 
our Egyptian civil code is not an explicitly Muslim law.75 
When Sadat amended the constitution to please the Islamist, Pope Shenouda was 
vociferously opposed. His approach changed following his years under house arrest and 
now the Coptic Orthodox position has moved from one of opposition during the 1980’s to 
one of cooperation. Outside observers of the interfaith scene and not familiar with politics 
of it all, find it interesting that the Coptic Orthodox Church, which historically, has had 
the longest relationship with Islamic authority,  the most conflicts, and arguably has lost 
the most members from conversion to Islam, now seems to feel quite at easy with the 
current formulation of the constitution. This, however, is contingent upon the semi-
secularists in the Mubarak regime keeping the Islamists in check and generally positive 
attitude emanating from al Azhar. Bishop Youannes states: 
The civil constitution that grants equal citizenship rights for all Egyptians 
is the real product of the dialogue of life in Egypt. Furthermore, dialogue 
of life has always been the safeguard for security of the Egyptian society 
in the moment of sectarian strife. 76  
Still, other Christians push for constitutional reform. In doing so, they walk a fine 
line, risking the ire of both Al-Azhar and the government ministry of religion. They 
continue to identify contradictions in the constitution as the source of problems. They 
find it difficult to harmonize the idea that the shari’ah is the main source of law (article 
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two) with all citizens being equal (article forty). I spoke to a senior leader if the small yet 
well-organized, vocal and well-funded Coptic Evangelical Association of Egypt, who 
communicated his dissatisfaction and insisted that there is room for improvement:   
This is an absolute contradiction [in the constitution]. How do you have 
equality if you exclude me as a Christian in article two and then include 
me in article forty?  How can we say there can be any equality? The 
problem is that here we are very selective when we deal with articles. 
When there are difficulties between Christians and Muslims, then we see 
how often the powers cite article two, meaning Islam is the law of the land 
and we are second class citizens. In times of tolerance, we see judges and 
politicians invoke article forty, where we are the fullest of citizens. I think 
we need some amendments to the constitution – mainly the second article. 
I am not for eliminating the second article because we should accept the 
feelings of the majority who are Muslims. But if the second article says 
that Islam should be the main source, then I think it should be changed and 
not be limited to Islamic law only, because this is a kind of discrimination. 
The second article should include all religious laws as sources. Some 
judges have dealt with Christians as second class citizens using this 
article.77    
Others from the Christian community have similar concerns which extent beyond 
the immediate particulars of Egyptian and the idiosyncrasies of Egyptian constitutional 
law. The Roman Catholic Church, for example, has a history of encounters with Islam 
that extends both in time and in space, and has a perspective beyond the local and 
national level. What happens in Egypt is important for its own sake, but also for how it 
can affect Christian communities throughout the Islamic world. The Catholic Church sees 
the constitutional and human rights of Christians in Egypt as bell-weather for Christian-
Muslim relations worldwide, as unlike the Coptic Church, it represents the needs of 
Palestinian, Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi, and Pakistani Christians. In some of these places, 
Christian communities are smaller than in Egypt, and in many they have even fewer 
rights. Thus, the protections that Christians have in Egypt are looked upon by the 
Catholic Church as important gains- and gains that need to be protected or improved 
upon in the scope of global Christian Muslim relations.   
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My senior Roman Catholic prelate stressed the importance of constitutional 
reforms that avoid either extreme, either the ultra-secular or the extreme Islamist:  
This issue [of reform] came up with the amendments to the Egyptian 
Constitution and a number of voices said it should be revised.  There could 
have been a greater discussion of the constitution at the time of the 
proposed amendments.  The Shari’ah law, as a number of Muslims would 
say, is a human construct and has developed over many centuries starting 
with al-Shafi, who wanted to bring unity to the madhabs.  But the 
Christians have been, and will continue to be, very uncomfortable with 
this and it is not the idea that Christians would have as their idea of a 
country in which they are full citizens. There is a difference between the 
idea of being full citizens and the provisions of Shari’ah law that go 
against this equality. This implementation of Shari’ah might throw the 
situation back to the Ottoman system and mean a return to the millets. 
This could be okay for matters of personal status, but not legal status. Is 
there any court that is superior to a Shari’ah court where you can appeal?  
Right now, there isn’t.78 
E. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CITIZENS 
In Egypt, matters which generally speaking, in the West would be considered 
family law (marriage, divorce, alimony, child custody, and burial) are regulated based on 
one’s religion, but not all religions. Consonant with past Ottoman practice, the principle 
of separate personal courts and/or laws for every recognized religious community and 
reserved seats in the parliament persists.  The application of family law is based on an 
individual’s religious beliefs. In the practice of family law, Muslim families are subject to 
the Personal Status Law, which draws on shari’ah Christian families, regardless of 
denomination, are subject to Canon Law of the Coptic Orthodox Church, and Jewish 
families are subject Orthodox Halakhic law. In cases of family law, disputes involving a 
marriage between a Christian woman and a Muslim man, the courts apply the Personal 
Status Law. Inheritance laws for all citizens are based on the Government’s interpretation 
of shari’ah. Muslim female heirs receive half the amount of a male heir’s inheritance. 
Christian widows of Muslims have no automatic inheritance rights but may be provided 
for in testamentary documents. Under shari’ah, converts from Islam lose all rights of 
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inheritance. However, because the Government offers no legal means for converts from 
Islam to Christianity to amend their civil records to reflect their new religious status, the 
converts’ loss of inheritance rights may not be indicated on civil documents.79   
 Christians demonstrated concern about the overall legal imbalances in family law, 
but also about this lack of bi-directional religious freedom. Most I spoke to want to see 
the constitution modified to allow a level playing field and am worried about the loss of 
members to both conversion, as well as immigration. For instance, in terms of inheritance 
under shari’ah, converts from Islam lose all rights of inheritance. As just mentioned, 
because the Government offers no legal means for converts from Islam to Christianity to 
amend their civil records to reflect their new religious status, the converts’ loss of 
inheritance rights may not be indicated on civil documents. My senior Coptic Evangelical 
interlocutor expressed his views as follows: 
I think we need to establish an environment of religious freedom, but in 
our Egyptian context it is difficult to convert to Christianity, and very easy 
to convert to Islam. This is due to the constitution… The majority who 
convert to Islam, I believe, is for the reasons related to divorce because 
they can’t divorce in the eyes of the Church, so they convert to Islam 
which permits, divorce, especially for the men.  Or they convert for 
economic reasons, for greater economic opportunity. Rarely do people 
move because of ideological reasons. However, I am working hard to re-
discuss divorce because there are situations where we as a church need to 
help solve this. We should take some initiatives as a church to help solve 
the problems of divorce among Christians and then the number that 
convert to Islam will drop greatly.80       
In short, the sense of Christian marginalization dates back the first Islamic 
conquest, and though there was a moment when Copts felt fuller in the early half of the 
twentieth century, the default position in the collective consciousness has been one of 
marginality. Yet, many moderate Muslim leaders such as the senior spokesman of the 
Supreme Council on Islamic Affairs cited above, and Ali Gomaa, the Grand Mufti, 
asserted that the Qur’an was an excellent foundation upon which to build a society since 
it held within its pages the basis for an egalitarian state- even for non-Muslims. They 
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claim that most problems of discrimination experienced by the Christian community have 
historically been isolated, disconnected incidents caused by individuals acting 
independently, or in some cases, caused faulty interpretation and  implementation. The 
Grand Mufti explained his understanding of the problem and challenged Christians to 
closely examine the source of their discontent: 
In terms of Shari’ah law being the law of the land, Christians need to 
reflect upon their experience here. What has been their position? They did 
not complain when under the Ottomans there was the Shari’ah. After the 
Ottomans, they complained about the millet laws dealing with dhimmis 
and these laws were eliminated. We asked, ‘what don’t you like?’ And 
they told us and we said, ‘fine, you want freedom from this? Then you are 
free.’ The new constitution made them free from all millet laws and millet 
councils. If properly understood and applied, the Shari’ah is fully 
compatible with modern notions of human rights and democracy  81 
I found, however, that many of the Christians who complained about legalized 
discrimination saw the problems as systemic, and traced the fundamental inequities 
enshrined in the system, itself, to the earlier historic model and what they saw as current 
contradictions in the Egyptian constitution. For them, because Article Two declares that 
“Islam is the Religion of the State,”   there is then no way that  “all citizens are equal 
before the law.”  For these critics, the law itself invited discrimination. This 
discrimination they described was often subtle, yet legal, reducing them to de-facto 
minorities, without minority rights or any government oversight into alleged abuses or 
discriminatory practices. Any time they would charge discrimination, the government, 
the officially sponsored state mouthpieces of both the Islamic and Christian communities 
would attempt to silence them, pointing out that article forty of the constitution gave 
them full citizenship.   
While the Muslim majority and the Copts  themselves frequently remind each 
other that they are full citizens under the constitution, to many, the assertion rings hollow.  
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The U.S. State Department found in its 2006 Report on Religious Freedom that the 
government generally upheld constitutional protections; however, they went on to note 
the following: 
…discrimination against non-Muslims exists. There are no Christians 
serving as presidents or deans of public universities, and they are rarely 
nominated by the Government to run in elections as National Democratic 
Party (NDP) candidates. For the first time in more than thirty years, a Copt 
was appointed one of the country’s twenty-six governors, in Qena. As of 
June 30, there were six Christians (five appointed, one elected) in the 454-
seat People’s Assembly; six Christians (all appointed) in the 264-seat 
Shura Council; and two Christians in the 32-member cabinet. Christians, 
who represented between 8 and 15 percent of the population, held less 
than 2 percent of the seats in the People’s Assembly and Shura Council. 82 
As it stands now, Christians perceive that the government and Muslim authorities 
tend not to identify any pattern of harassment but instead, respond to each incident as a 
unique occurrence.  When I spoke to a diplomat from the political and economic section 
at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, she confirmed the impression that the Christians but 
particularly the Copts seem to flail about in this regard. This diplomat stated: 
The Coptic Community is more frustrated now than in the past.  There is 
not just a lack of progress in achieving economic wellbeing or justice. 
There are real concerns of conversion, assimilation, immigration and 
contention with the government. No one here who has any sense can look 
at this situation from a critical perspective and say they have equal 
rights.83 
In addition to reporting general figures, trends and statistics, the 2006 U.S. State 
Department’s Report on Religious Freedom in Egypt cites specific cases, which have 
since entered into the popular and collective perception and consciousness of the Coptic 
and Christian communities. 
Government practices discriminated against Christians in hiring for the 
public sector, staff appointments to public universities, payment of 
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Muslim imams through public funds and barring Christians from study at 
Al-Azhar University (a publicly funded institution). There are few 
Christians in the upper ranks of the security services and armed forces. In 
general public university training programs for Arabic language teachers 
bar non-Muslims because the curriculum involves the study of the Qur’an. 
In fall 2005 Christian student Christine Zaher successfully completed the 
requirements for a master’s degree in Arabic from the Suez Canal 
University in Port Said and secured a teaching position at the same 
university. Prior to her graduation, there had been no reports of Christian 
graduates in Arabic language since 2001; she was the first Copt appointed 
to a university level Arabic language teaching position in several decades. 
84 
When it comes to discussing discrimination, understanding the perception on the 
street is essential. It is important to know how stories are spun, who spins them, how 
facts are selected, distorted, omitted and transmitted, and thus, how rumors get started.  
This helps us understand how communities develop a discourse of grievance. This is not 
intended to diminish the validity of stark facts on the ground as cited above. It is 
necessary to see how such facts are framed and massaged into an identity and a 
consciousness of a victimized minority. This, then, can become the preferred prism 
through which all actions of the “other” are viewed. Often, the rumors, personal 
anecdotes, and media reports serve to confirm and reinforce the worst. A prominent 
Danish pastor working with a Danish government funded program in Cairo is familiar 
with process by which many incidents become grist for such a mill: 
In the community circulate the “grand narratives” which are stories of 
oppression and atrocities that go around, but it difficult to actually find the 
individuals who are the supposed victims. I think that these are stories that 
get exaggerated in the story telling.  … There are many such stories is 
circulating. Then what happens is that these stories often go abroad and 
get blown up.  These narratives of grievance return back to Egypt after the 
Copt lobby gets a hold of them. It is a narrative of grievance, which is a 
two-edged sword. 85 
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Most Christian leaders note that even a pattern of discrimination does not 
necessarily translate into persecution. Nevertheless, the majority cited situations where 
cases of discrimination went unaddressed by authorities. Indeed, the Christian leadership 
in general finds that the lack-luster response to some of these cases is just as troubling as 
the offenses themselves. As stated earlier, Muslim leaders, generally perceive issues of 
discrimination as random of acts of misguided or even corrupt individuals, who need to 
be better supervised. My senior spokesman at the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs 
implied that the Christian discourse of under-representation was a misperception, stating 
that a disproportionate number of Christians are found among the well-off and the elite, 
and observing that, “there is the typical sociological relationship between the privileged 
minority and underprivileged majority, and some Muslims would actually say that the 
Christians are a “qualitative majority.”86  
For most Muslims with whom I spoke, equality was the norm and discrimination 
the exception. When apparent inequities were pointed out, many Muslims identified the 
self-limiting attitude and non-participation of the Christians as a self-defeating, 
unpatriotic myth promulgated by the media in the West. Though these Muslims 
frequently acknowledged the domination of the Muslims in the political and 
administrative life of the country, they were adamant that it should not be viewed as the 
result of discriminatory practices, but simply as a reflection of a demographic reality. As 
the Grand Mufti asserted: 
Here, in Egypt, we must avoid speaking of majority and minority, since 
we grew up together as children, went to school together and our families 
are neighbors. We do business together and are all Egyptians…I perceive 
that the problems were political, not religious. It is important to speak 
about supposed (italics to indicate his emphasis) discrimination. While I 
acknowledge that this exists, I cannot say we should blame the system 
because it is not a problem with the Egyptian system. It is really a 
reflection of the demographic reality here in Egypt. It is important to 
differentiate between matters of racism and simple matters of 
demographics. In examining legislation we always have to ask if it leads 
to greater competition (between religious groups) or to cooperation.  We 
                                                 
 86  Op Cit. G. Martin, May 25, 2007. 
61 
 
have no member of parliament who is a Christian, not even one who is 
running. Why? I say that it is for the same reason that the US has never 
had a black President, and has had only one Roman Catholic. 87 
Moreover, the Christian leaders find that the discrimination is frequently so subtle 
that Muslims, who are used to being in the majority, fail to appreciate how excluded the 
minority can feel. My senior evangelical spokesman cites particular areas of concern: 
In theory, in Egypt, according to the constitution there is no persecution as 
found in the laws as they are written…. However, in all fairness, I must 
say that there is discrimination based on individuals who are influenced by 
extremists, or they, themselves, are extremists and they practice 
discrimination rather than persecution…. I would also like to see laws 
against people who practice discrimination, and so I would like to see laws 
that protect and monitor acts of bias or injustice based on religion.  
…Equality needs to be more than theory, it needs “legs on the ground” so 
people can see it and live it. Not much happens now to someone who 
discriminates against Christians. I would like to see Christians also get rid 
of the article of faith that says we can blame everything on being 
persecuted; we have to stop just repeating this. We need to integrate into 
the social life and get into all sectors and not self-exclude ourselves. 88 
Most reports indicate that Christians have little representation in the political 
affairs of the country. Often those few who serve in the government are appointed, not 
elected. Fed by an apathy born of marginalization and “self- imposed ghettoization,” the 
Christians seem to identify the issues, but are without much of a plan or method as to 
how to organize and leverage the government. There does not seem to be much desire or 
capacity to gain the support of government authorities to promote administrative changes 
and to react to discrimination in a systematic way. Most concur that it has been an uphill 
battle trying to get the authorities to recognize the pervasiveness of the problem of 
discrimination, and to implement policies to correct the abuses or ensure the Christians 
are provided for as “protected” minorities. Opinions differ on the degree to which the 
problem is fundamentally a problem of the legal substance, or legal application, with 
most Muslim religious authorities, unlike secularist Muslims, defending the use of 
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shari’ah as the main source of civil law. They do not attribute problems experienced by 
the Christian communities to inconsistencies or inequities deriving from the constitution. 
Instead, they tend to lay the blame for injustices on the imperfect interpretation and 
application of the shari’ah, but not with shari’ah, itself. The high-ranking spokesperson 
for the Supreme Council on Islamic Affairs, a very urbane, Western-educated Muslim, 
asserts that equality for all is possible under the shari’ah: 
For me there is no contradiction between Shari’ah and the Civil Code. 
However, the content of the law and its application are two different 
things.  This, again, has to do with education of Muslims on how to deal 
with non-Muslims, and the influence of a very political press. If you apply 
correctly and honestly the Qur’an, non-Muslims are protected and have 
the same rights.  The Qur’an is educational in this regard, so it comes 
down to a problem of culture.  There are attitudes of rejection which come 
from the non-Muslims, But Pope Shenouda understands. He is not a 
puppet of the government, and Article Two of the constitution (making 
Islam the religion of the land and the Shari’ah the main source of the law) 
does not bother him because he knows the Qur’an. The danger is a 
political one, because the bad attitudes come from popular, cheap, low, 
culture.  There is toleration in texts of all monotheistic traditions.  89 
Not all Christians necessarily disagree with his assessment. There are those 
leaders who believe that in substance, the Egyptian Constitution embodies a balance of 
Christian and Muslim values and offers adequate, unbiased protection to both groups. For 
instance, during one of the most violent of times in which Copts were experiencing near 
daily assaults from Islamists, Pope Shenouda deflected criticism that the Copts were 
being persecuted 
Violence, Shenuda claimed, indiscriminately targeted both Muslims and 
Copts, which showed that its leaders were far removed from the true faith 
of Islam, as even the ulama conceded. Reiterating its traditional assertion 
of loyalty to the state, the Coptic Church rejected criticism emanating 
from the United States regarding the alleged persecution of Copts in 
Egypt90 
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My high-ranking Anglican clergyperson, who enjoys extraordinarily good 
relations with Al-Azhar, expresses views similar to those espoused by the senior 
spokesman for the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs.  He, too, attributes the problems 
to incidents of misinterpretation and misapplication, as well as to a particular resistance 
to secularism. He states: 
The Shari’ah is popular as a symbol. The government is afraid to call 
itself secular because the understanding of the term here is atheist and 
godless. What they think in terms of the word ‘secular” is not what you 
think.  Even the intellectual Muslim interprets it to mean irreligious. They 
don’t see secularism as a simple separation of mosque and state.  Of 
course, this is a contradiction but it depends on how people behave. The 
problem is not in the Shari’ah, but in the interpretation of the Shari’ah. 
What interpretation shall be applied? In terms of conversion and apostasy 
some say that people who convert should be killed after three days if they 
don’t repent.  Another view is that they should be given a grace period 
until the end of their lives and God will then judge. We, as Christians have 
no problem with Shari’ah, but with its interpretation and implementation.  
91   
This leads me to discuss one of the most hotly debated, and most variegated 
issues regarding the legal status of religions minorities to emerge anywhere in the 
Muslim world in the last 25 years. A heated debate over whether or not Copts are in fact, 
minorities, and should be recognized as such, first began when Sa’ad iddine Ibrahim and 
the Ibn Khaldoun Center sponsored a conference on the topic back in 1994. This 
conference apparently hit a raw nerve, reflecting the tension both within the Coptic 
community and the larger Egyptian society. This controversy burns hot still today and I 
argue that at its heart, this debate is whether the dhimmi narrative should or should not be 
an accepted as an “orienting” narrative to govern the non-Muslim minority.   There are 
cleavages that do not run along sectarian lines here, making one less sure about the 
motives of those who retrieve and deploy of the dhimmi metaphor and analogy in 
reference to this debate on minority rights.   At first glance, one might assume that all 
Christians would insist on being considered full citizens. At first glance, one might think 
that the Islamist elements would prefer to see Christians relegated to the status of 
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“dhimmitude” in the classical sense.  Yet, in effect, there are both Christians and Muslim 
who take issue with the notion of Copts as full citizens of a modern, secular Egyptian 
state. There are both Christians and Muslims who state that Christians should be 
considered protected minorities, not always, however for the same reasons. A senior 
Anglican clergyman considered a reality that should be acknowledged, at the same time 
noting that minority status should not mean a diminished form of citizenship: 
The dialogue we have now is about how we can best deal with 
misconceptions and generalizations.  We speak about the Muslim 
minorities in West and minorities in Egypt.  Some Copts don’t like being 
considered a minority but this is like putting our head in the sand. But this 
is the fact and many conflicts are because of the rights of the minorities 
are not respected. 92 
Some see that the full citizenship of the Copts as a necessary myth to ensure 
social cohesion and national unity.  Others, Christians and Muslims, regard it as a 
transparent lie, and a farce, pointing to facts that don’t support the reality. What is 
interesting is that whether one sees notions of equal citizenship as valid or invalid, or 
whether one argues for  the recognition of a Coptic minority nation or not, it  comes 
down to a debate between whether one wants to approach the situation from a normative 
or a realist position. The situation becomes even more complex when one comes to 
appreciate the conflicting motivations held by those who support the same positions.  
And here is the crux of the matter, and perhaps the main question that emerges as a result 
of writing this thesis: would the recognition and classification of the Coptic/Christian 
community as a “minority” community, constitute, as is feared by some and  
recommended by others,  a return to the dhimmi experience?  In my conclusion, I will 
provide taxonomy of the various positions vis-à-vis a modernist dhimmi narrative and the 
possible nuanced political positions that such usage can indicate. 
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F. GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY SERVICE 
Because Christians are constitutionally equal citizens there are theoretically no 
bars to entrance into government service or anything that legally could prevent them from 
rising in the ranks. Nothing like the devishirme system of the Ottomans exists, nor has 
existed for centuries. At the same time, there are no special programs, conscriptions or 
“tracks” or official ‘minority preference/quota or “affirmative action” type programs to 
speak of. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, yearly report, 
“Copts are present in most institutions of the state, and there are Coptic members of all 
registered political parties.” However, the report also indicates “Copts continue to face 
state discrimination in such areas as university admissions, public spending, [and] 
military promotions.”93 
Coptic diaspora groups have collected documentation and repeatedly called 
attention to Muslim army officers have been subjected Christian draftees to persecution 
and extreme torture leading sometimes to their death, as a way to force them to convert to 
Islam.94 
Today Copts are disproportionately represented among the ranks of prosperous 
city dwellers. Urban Copts tended to favor careers in commerce and the professions, 
whereas the livelihoods of rural Copts were virtually indistinguishable from their Muslim 
counterparts. Urban Copts are stratified into groups of long-time residents and groups of 
recent migrants from the countryside. The latter group, often impoverished, falls outside 
the traditional urban Coptic community and some can be found among the zabaliin, the 
traditional garbage collectors and recyclers.  The former group included many university 
professors, lawyers, doctors, a few prominent public officials, and a substantial middle 
echelon of factory workers and service sector employees. However, only in 2007 was a 
Coptic woman allowed to teach Arabic at one of the government run Universities (Ain 
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Shams), challenging the Muslim monopoly. Until then, it has generally been accepted 
that to truly know Arabic one had to be a Muslim.  This is also the pattern in other areas 
of   government service; Copts are generally underrepresented.    
For some years, President Mubarak to compensate for the lack of duly elected 
Christian representation. Usually, because so few Copts manage to get elected, he has had 
to appoint them. In 1990, following a series of attacks against Copts and churches in 
Upper Egypt, Mubarak “in an attempt to appease Copts, gave five of the ten 
presidentially appointed seats in Egypt’s Parliament to Copts.”95 According to the same 
source in Feb 23, 1993 a Reuters article quoted Copts complaining of the government  
showing preferential treatment in terms of awarding   scholarships and  promoting  and 
selecting qualified personnel for upper government jobs;  Moreover, they  substantiated 
that  there was significant   “discrimination and segregation by teachers and school 
officials of Coptic students and the removal of all reference to Copts and Christianity 
from many school curriculums.”96 I will conclude this segment with an excerpt from the 
U.S. State Department’s 2009 Report of Human Rights for Egypt: 
There are no Christians serving as presidents or deans of the country’s 17 
public universities. On April 12, 2009, the weekly newspaper Watani 
reported that of nearly 700 president, dean, or vice dean positions in the 
country’s public university system, only one position is filled by a 
Christian. The Government rarely nominates Copts to run in elections as 
National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates. Christians, who represent 
between 8 and 12 percent of the population, hold fewer than 2 percent of 
the seats in the People’s Assembly and Shura Council. In November 2008, 
Al Youm Al Saba, an Internet news service, reported that the number of 
Copts accepted in the National Police Academy for the year 2008-2009 
was 24 out of 1,600.  As of June 30, 2008, there were six Christians (five 
appointed, one elected) in the 454-seat People’s Assembly; six Christians 
(all appointed) in the 264-seat Shura Council; two in the 32-member 
cabinet; and one governor of the country’s 28 was Christian. There are 
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few Christians in the upper ranks of the security services and armed 
forces. Public funds compensate Muslim imams but not Christian clergy.97  
G. TAXATION 
In Egypt, the jizya was abolished by the Napoleonic regime that briefly ruled in 
Egypt and later in 1855 by Said Pasha, after the Gulhane Rescript of 1839 and before the 
Hatt I Humayun in 1856. Taxation is now universal according to the constitution for all 
members of the “three heavenly religions,” and no differentiation is made based upon 
one’s religious affiliation. Taxes collected by the state are levied on all citizens. While 
egalitarian in the matter of collection, one could make a case that the expenditure of tax 
monies is less so. According to the U.S. State Department, “the Government appoints and 
pays the salaries of the imams who lead prayers in mosques and monitors their sermons 
but does not contribute to the funding of Christian churches.”98 The same can be said for 
state funds spend on religious programming: tax monies are spent liberally on shows that 
convey an Islamic message and content while none of the state funds is spent on 
Christian programming.  The fact that the government collects taxes from Christians but 
“bars them from studying at Al-Azhar University, a publicly funded institution with 
approximately half a million students” could also be framed as a matter of an uneven and 
discriminatory expenditure of taxes. 
H.  CHURCH BUILDING AND REPAIR  
The contemporary interpretation of the 1856 Ottoman Hamayouni decree, 
partially still in force, had until 2005, required non-Muslims to obtain a presidential 
decree to build new churches and synagogues. In addition, MOI regulations, issued in 
1934 under the Al-Ezabi decree, specified a set of ten conditions that the Government 
had to consider before a presidential decree for construction of a new non-Muslim place 
of worship could be issued. According to Sa’ad’Eddine Ibrahim, noted Egyptian 
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professor of sociology and long-time critic of the Mubarak regime, mentioned earlier in 
the paper for championing the classification of Copts as minorities: 
.. nothing is as symbolic as the persistence of the Humayonic Decree, 
which requires no less than a presidential permit for the building, 
renovation — or even the minor repair — of churches. Of course, no such 
restrictions exist on the building of mosques. This decree, the remnants of 
an Ottoman law and the most oppressive of any discriminatory law, is 
expressly intended to restrict the ability of Copts to practice their faith. .. 
there can be no genuine hope for true democracy, civil liberties or the 
abatement of deeply entrenched religious discrimination in Egypt as long 
as the Humayonic Decree stands in flagrant violation of the constitution 
and human rights...99 
The conditions included the requirement that the distance between a church and a 
mosque not be less than 100 meters (340 feet) and that approval of the neighboring 
Muslim community be obtained before a permit to build a new church may be issued. In 
1997, the Coptic publicist Milad Hanna complained that “we live in a fundamentalist 
country, like Iran or Saudi Arabia,” and he asserted that “they [Copts] should be able to 
exercise their right to build and repair their churches.”100 
One of the most bitter complaints Christians now aired vocally (and an 
obvious priority for Shenuda) concerned discrimination in building houses 
of prayer. The law relating to the construction of churches was based on 
the Ottoman hatt-i humayun (noble rescript) of 1856, which guaranteed 
equality between Muslims and non-Muslims in the empire but also 
required government licensing to erect a church. A 1934 Egyptian 
government decree further specified ten restricting conditions for the 
construction of churches, including a minimum distance between churches 
and between a church and the nearest mosque, as well as the absence of 
objection on the part of Muslim neighbors. Getting a license to build a 
new church became an increasingly tedious matter, with the government 
never too enthusiastic to grant it.  101 
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In December 2005, in a move to decentralize and “power down” to lower 
echelons, President Mubarak declared that it was no longer necessary that churches 
obtain presidential authorization to repair and rebuild.  This authority has now been 
granted to the provincial governors, in theory streamlining the process. However,   
according to the 2006 U.S. State Department’s Report on Religious Freedom in Egypt, 
churches still have encountered difficulty in obtaining permits.  For example, there are 
complaints that local officials, acting arbitrarily, delay ordinary repairs such as painting 
of walls and plumbing by incorrectly classifying them as “reconstruction” projects. This 
misclassification means that formal permits must be sought instead of a simple 
notification.  
Some churches have complained that local security officials have blocked 
church repairs or improvements even when a permit has been issued. 
Others suggest unequal enforcement of the regulations pertaining to 
church and mosque projects. 102 
Nevertheless, the State Department’s report shows that by most accounts things 
have improved. Figures published by the Egyptian Government’s Official Gazette, 
indicate that sixty-three Presidential decrees were issued from June 30, 2005, through 
July 1, 2006, for church-related construction, whereas only twelve permits were issued 
during the previous period.103 Perceptions, though, are slow to change among the 
Christian population. Echoing the sentiment  that “ one warm day, doesn’t make a 
summer,” a prominent clergyman in the Coptic Evangelical community, like many other 
Christian leaders, says that more can be done in this regard, since it is still quite difficult 
to obtain permission to build new churches, not just repair the old ones.    
There is still a harsh law on the books against Church building and when 
Muslims discover that Christians are building a church, maybe without 
waiting for permission, or even with permission, then there are fights as it 
happened in Giza and Alexandria. These occasions happen constantly. The 
law makes it difficult for Christians to build new churches. This is a heavy 
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matter. I see what happens and so I conclude which church can get built, 
and I see that we need to have this law modified. 104 
Because the churches are such obvious, visible signs and symbols of the Christian 
presence, it is not unusual that they are frequently the target or the setting for sectarian 
clashes.  Alexandria, Giza, and Luxor, during 2005 and 2006, witnessed significant strife.  
According to the U.S. State Department: 
In the October (2005) incident, a young Muslim man, enraged by reports 
that some Christians had staged a play critical of Islam, attacked several 
Christians outside a church. Subsequent riots left three Muslims dead and 
resulted in significant damage to Copt (Egyptian Christian) private 
properties and some damage to churches.105 
The same report states that on January 18, 2006 there were serious sectarian 
clashes in the settlement of Udayssat, near Luxor wherein Christians were found to be 
conducting an Epiphany service in a building that had periodically served as an 
unlicensed church since 1971.  The repeated use of an unauthorized building provoked 
Muslims to act: 
Several hundred Muslim residents of the area surrounded the building, 
vandalized the property, and attempted to set it ablaze. In the ensuing 
melee, approximately a dozen persons, both Christian and Muslim, were 
injured, along with several policemen. On January 20 assailants killed a 
forty-seven-year-old Christian farmer, Kamal Shaker Megalaa, as he 
returned from his fields. The Luxor district attorney ordered the arrest and 
investigation of several Muslims from Udayssat on suspicion of 
involvement in his murder. 106 
Two and a half years after promulgation of Decree 291/2005, church and lay 
leaders complained that the permit process remains susceptible to delay by local officials. 
They charged that some local authorities refused to process applications without certain 
“supporting documents” that were virtually impossible to obtain (e.g., a presidential 
decree authorizing the existence of a church that had been established during the 
                                                 
 104  Op Cit, Martin, G. August 8, 2009. 
 105 Op Cit., United States Department of State, 2008. 
 106  Ibid., 5. 
71 
 
country’s monarchical era). Others complain that some local authorities categorize 
routine repairs and maintenance (e.g., painting of walls and plumbing repairs) as 
expansion/reconstruction projects, thus requiring formal permits versus simple 
notification. They also maintain that security forces blocked them from using permits that 
had been issued, and at times denied them permits, for repairs to church buildings and the 
supply of water and electricity to existing church facilities. Such incidents often 
depended on the attitude of local security officials and the governorate leadership toward 
the church and on their personal relationships with representatives of the churches. As a 
result, congregations have experienced lengthy delays—years in many cases—while 
waiting for new building permits.  
In 2008, the U.S. State Dept reported that “local authorities have closed down 
unlicensed places of worship. As a result of restrictions, some communities use private 
buildings and apartments for religious services or build without permits.”107  
I. RELIGIOUS PRACTICES 
Today in Egypt, there are no tangible similarities between the restrictions and 
sanctions placed on the ahl al dhimma such as those found in the Pact of Umar or under 
the Ottoman millet system. However, we must consider that practices have evolved. A 
broadcast or a website today is what a religious procession was in the days of the 
Ottomans. Public practices of religion have changed and the new media has replaced the 
main streets and plazas.  The local media, including state television and newspapers, 
gives prominence to Islamic programming, while Christian television programs are aired 
weekly on state-owned Nile Cultural TV. In 2002, Pope Shenouda protested:    
All we want is equal relations between the two parts of the [Arab] nation, 
because often the Christians do not find reasonable space in which to 
function… No one accepts the American preacher’s [Jerry Falwell] attack 
on Islam in a loathsome manner. Yet I cannot even count the articles, 
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books, and publications attacking Christians in Egypt, and we let these 
things pass, so as not to start big problems, or even small ones. 108 
On August 11, 2009, the United States Commission on International Religious 
Freedom (USCIRF) released a letter sent to American President Barack Obama, 
petitioning him to address the difficulties that religious minorities face in Egypt. In the 
letter, which was sent ahead of President Hosni Mubarak’s visit to the United States, 
USCIRF also asked Obama to promote freedom of speech in Egypt for both the religious 
minorities and the Muslim majority in Egypt. 
J. COMMUNAL REPRESENTATION    
Religious and political leaders in many parts of the non-western world have had 
to deal with resurgent traditionalists, and religio-political identities, at the same time 
operating alongside, if not often within, the secular paradigm.  With the strictly secular 
model appearing on the wane, we are seeing both continuity and discontinuity with the 
past as Muslim and Christian leaders, no longer confining themselves to strictly spiritual 
matters, are reasserting their traditional temporal roles. By word and deed, they are 
forming the ethos and shaping the political milieu in which Christians and Muslims have 
historically interacted.  Regarding some issues, this means returning to earlier times when 
religious leaders were de facto representatives of their communities. It has meant a break 
with some aspects of secularism, as well as attempts to retrieve the more distant past, its 
confessionalism, and its millet system, but for some it has meant blazing new paths.  
In terms of Christian inter-communal relations, I found that between the Coptic 
Orthodox and other Christians there exists a degree of rivalry. There appears to be a 
desire among the significantly larger Coptic Orthodox Church to maintain its primacy, 
which translates at times into an exclusive claim to speak for all Egyptian Christians. The 
other Christian groups accept this and, indeed, appreciate the sacrifices that the Coptic 
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Orthodox Church has made over the centuries, granting it a certain primum inter pares 
status. However, the smaller, but very well-organized and well-funded Coptic 
Evangelical Church feels that the Coptic Orthodox resent their presence at the table of 
interfaith dialogue. A high-ranking Coptic Evangelical pastor and community organizer, 
and a member of the Egyptian Council of Protestant Churches lamented that “it is 
difficult to be a minority within a minority,” and declared that the relationship with the 
Coptic Orthodox is so difficult that he “has given up on ecumenism.”109  
Muslim leadership has also found it difficult at times to identify who exactly 
speaks for Christianity. The Grand Mufti, Ali Gomaa cited, as an example of Christian 
discord, the inability of the Christian leaders to come to an agreement about what 
recommendation they should make to the government about its divorce laws. Muslim 
authorities tended to see this as an example of internal Christian discord. The Grand 
Mufti expressed frustration at the Christian leadership’s lack of cohesiveness and ability 
to clearly articulate their recommendations led to Muslim perplexity and exasperation.  
Under Pope Shenouda’s pontificate these relations have enjoyed moments of 
alienation and confrontation, as well as rapprochement, cooperation and solidarity. In 
light of the scarce and limited presence of Christians in political life, Pope Shenouda, as 
the leader of the largest Christian community in Egypt, has often been the main 
representative of Christian concerns. He has communicated to the Egyptian government 
and to the world these concerns, championing the cause of Copts, but often all Egyptian 
Christians. When I asked a senior Coptic Evangelical leader about relations with the 
Coptic leadership and probed him regarding his feelings on degree of cooperation 
between Coptic Evangelicals and Coptic Orthodox Church, he made the following 
comments: 
We have good relations, sometimes, but the relationship has had 
turbulence and now we look to a post Pope Shenouda period. This is a 
very complicated issue. When you are a minority of a minority, like us, 
you have it tough. Ecumenism is not working well it the Middle East. I 
must be blunt. It is painful. The relations with the Coptic Orthodox Church 
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go back and forth in a way that is not healthy…They want to benefit from 
the money from the West which comes mostly from Protestant churches. 
They don’t see us as a church, but as a people who want us to proselytize 
and to convert Coptic Orthodox to Protestantism. 110 
The Grand Mufti of Al-Azhar, in explaining the history of relations with the 
Coptic Church, offered a historical perspective on Pope Shenouda’s pontificate, alluding 
to Shenouda’s reticence in embracing egalitarian reforms. The Grand Mufti’s subtle, 
historical reference below could indicate that the Mufti senses that the Pope preferred the 
older, Ottoman-style form of millet rayih representation, where the power was more 
consolidated in the hands of the local patriarch.   
It sometimes seems to me that only Pope Shenouda has been dissatisfied 
with this [the Egyptian Constitution] and would like to see a return to the 
millet council. I personally saw a dramatic change in the approach of Pope 
Shenouda. He had a lot of problems under Sadat and was in prison. Sadat 
wanted to have a Muslim committee oversee the affairs of the church, 
which, of course, Shenouda fought.  The question emerged and still lingers 
for us: Is he a political or religious leader? Clearly, “he has an agenda.” 
[exact words here, spoken in English] He is ambitious. But I think that the 
times changed, more than Shenouda has changed the times. 111 
Copts, themselves, are somewhat unsettled at the prospect of a transition, given 
that Pope Shenouda ascended to his position in 1971. There is some obvious jockeying 
going on.  Although Egypt has a very ambiguous church-state/ mosque-state 
arrangement, there has been an unusual attempt to apply the civil code to religious 
matters. Labib Halim, the Vice President of the State Council, “has proposed a new 
regulation granting all Copts the right to elect their pope. The present rules bar Copt 
laymen to take part in this process, rendering the electoral system unconstitutional.”112  
According current canons, only the Holy Synod and members of the Coptic Religious 
Endowments Authority have the right to vote for a new Pope.  
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According to Bishop Youannes of the Coptic Orthodox Church representation of 
one’s community now falls under the modern rubric of “Dialogue of Life” which he sees 
“is a way of life and coexisting in the Egyptian society where Copts and Muslims live as 
neighbors, striving and working together in response to their day-today common 
problems and challenges.”113  He considers this to include “the Christian and Muslim 
religious leaders such as Pope Shenouda III and the Shaykh of Al-Azhar, as well as the 
other bishops and shaykhs in official conferences and festivals frequently with the aim of 
enhancing the relations at the institutional level.”114 Bishop Youannes states that its 
purpose in the optimal situation is  “where community members, both Christians and 
Muslims, get together and cooperate in a genuine way in the development process; 
discussing their community concerns and problems, advocating for their rights and 
making the best use of their local resources.” 115   
Yet for the Christian community it still appears at times that the issue of control 
over what, whom, when and where discussions will take place is a major factor. One of 
the primary criteria for being able to represent one’s community was legitimacy.  Muslim 
authorities expressed some frustration with the Christian community in this arena. Al 
Azhar wants there to be one representative as in the days of the Christian millet. 
However, today in Egypt that is unlikely given there are now denominations and the 
Christian churches cannot sort out who should be their legitimate spokesperson and 
articulate their own position on family issues, particularly divorce. This apparent lack of 
coherence reflects poorly upon the state of the Church, but also confounds religious 
authorities such as those at Al-Azhar who hope to facilitate such matters. As the Grand 
Mufti states: 
I will give you an example regarding divorce wherein the state let the 
Christians make their own recommendations to the state. They came to the 
Government after having agreed on nine points to present the government 
legislature, but then at the last moment they fell into arguing with each 
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other and so I say that the problems in the Christian community have more 
to do with their internal sectarian politics than with the Shari’ah or 
Islam.116   
While the acceptance of this multiplicity of viewpoints, and the recognition of 
several legitimate spokespersons ensures that the fullest possible picture of Christian 
concerns gets represented, this same range and diversity of positions is not as well-
represented on the Muslim side, largely due to the authority and the ability of Al-Azhar 
(and thus the government) to control the message and the terms of discourse. Despite the 
best efforts of the official interlocutors to recognize each other as the legitimate 
representatives of the Muslim communities, internally, they often found themselves 
challenged by voices within their own communities. Unlike, Ottoman times, when it was 
very clear that the official ulema and none others spoke for Islam, today in Egypt Al 
Azhar has some competitors. These dissonant voices were often referred to as “deviant,” 
“extremist” or “unorthodox.”  A high-ranking spokesperson of the Government’s 
Supreme Council on Islamic Affairs has actually repudiated the ulema’s monopoly and 
control over who could represent the Muslim umma. He, himself, as a layman and as an 
ex-member of the Muslim Brotherhood, has continued to carefully cultivate relationships 
with a variety of factions for many years.   
I reject the professionalization of religion, for example, control by the 
ulama and the idea that no one else has any right to speak.  At the same 
time, there is a big role for the ulama. They must be al ulama al istanaar 
‘ones that give the light,’ and must not let fanatics dominate discourse. 
They run the risk of becoming the silent majority, because the media pays 
attention to the fanatics. 117 
The Grand Mufti, Ali Gomaa, was keen on asserting the role for Al Azhar as 
primum inter pares. “Al-Azhar speaks for Islam”118  he asserted, and recently has been 
calling for an international Muslim panel of jurists (fuqaha) to limit who can legitimately 
issue fatwas   
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One of the problems faced by religious communities today is the issue of 
authority. In both Islam and other religions we are witnessing a 
phenomenon in which lay people without a sound foundation in religious 
learning have attempted to set themselves up as religious authorities, even 
though they lack the scholarly qualifications for making valid 
interpretations of religious law and morality. It is this eccentric and 
rebellious attitude towards religion that opens the way for extremist 
interpretations of Islam that have no basis in reality.119 
Indeed, Christian leaders, for the most part, tended to prefer Al-Azhar as the 
official voice and most expressed hope that Al-Azhar’s teachings would prevail. Most 
said that the best thing for non-Muslim minorities was for Al-Azhar to recover its 
authoritative role among the world’s Muslim community. 
K. CONVERSION AND APOSTASY 
For the most part, the situation in terms of conversion both from and away from 
Islam corresponds to the historic pattern with however, so further elaboration in terms of 
Egypt’s participation in several international human rights agreements. I will summarize 
the state of the law below in term of  the areas apostasy and conversion as applied to 
marriage, inheritance, religious affinity and how the perpetuation of discriminatory 
practices are reconciled with international conventions. 
There are multiple reasons and situations wherein a person would convert or have 
to convert from being a non-Muslim to a Muslim. These are fully contemplated in the 
law. I will discuss some areas where conversion, is, by law, obligatory and wherein the 
law prescribes administrative steps pursuant to the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam. 
Many of these involve marriage and the status of children born to a non-Muslim mother 
and Muslim father.  Under Egypt’s understanding of shari’ah, non-Muslim males must 
convert to Islam to marry Muslim women, but non-Muslim women need not convert to 
marry Muslim men. Muslim women are prohibited from marrying Christian men.      
According to the shari’ah as interpreted by the Government, a non-Muslim wife 
who converts to Islam must divorce her “apostate,” non-Muslim husband. After the 
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wife’s conversion, local security authorities ask the non-Muslim husband if he is willing 
to convert to Islam; if he chooses not to, divorce proceedings begin immediately. The 
minor children of converts to Islam, and in some cases adult children, will automatically 
become classified as Muslims in the eyes of the Government irrespective of the religion 
of the other spouse. This practice is in accordance with the Government’s interpretation 
of shari’ah, which dictates “no jurisdiction of a non-Muslim over a Muslim.”120  
In disputes involving a marriage between a Christian woman and a Muslim man, 
the courts apply shari’ah as well.121  Under the shari’ah, converts from Islam lose all 
rights of inheritance, but this is difficult to ascertain when push comes to shove because 
no legal record of such a conversion is ever made.  What is important to note is that the 
interpretation is consonant with the historical one and permits Muslims something it does 
not permit Christians.  
In terms of the far touchier issue, conversion away from Islam, we can say that 
religious conversion to Christianity or away from Islam for any reason remains a difficult 
issue. In January 2008, the Cairo Administrative Court, a court of first access, ruled that 
freedom to convert does not extend to Muslim citizens.122  As is historically the pattern, 
the government does not recognize conversions of individuals originally Muslim to 
Christianity or other religions. Because of this, those who do convert often prefer to do so 
in private. There is considerable fear of harassment from the authorities and Islamist 
organizations.  On the other hand, conversions by Christians to Islam get significant 
positive publicity in the media. The weekly religion page of the prominent daily Al-
Ahram often reports on conversions to Islam and claims that converts improved their 
lives and found peace and moral stability. 
Copts were alarmed by the mounting pressure from Islamic religious 
circles to impose Islamic law on all Egyptians. One such Islamic initiative, 
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publicly considered in the mid-1970s, was the “apostasy law” (qanun al-
ridda ) that sought to apply the shari’a-prescribed death penalty to 
apostates, including Christians who had converted to Islam temporarily (a 
common practice among Copts, for certain practical reasons). Another 
demand, put forth toward the end of the decade, was for the shari’a to be 
proclaimed “the main source of legislation” in Egypt. The government 
dropped the apostasy law following a Coptic uproar, but then succumbed 
to Muslim pressures and adopted the latter demand, changing the 
constitution accordingly in May 1980.  Such readiness by the state to 
introduce discriminatory religious measures—whether  yielding to radical 
Islamic pressures or due to its own pro-Islamic prejudice—was highly 
worrisome to the Copts. “That a single Muslim should embrace 
Christianity is an unbearable scandal and an assault on the public order,” 
Mirit Butrous-Ghali, a leading Copt thinker, charged bitterly, “while it is 
permissible, acceptable and desirable for hundreds of Copts to convert to 
Islam. [The state] makes things easy for [such converts to Islam], 
providing them with benefits and gifts, and joyful celebrations and parades 
are organized for them in the streets,” he noted.  123     
Where there has been some slippage in the traditional stance towards conversion 
and apostasy is in the Egyptian state’s finessing of the issue when it comes to arena of 
international human rights; something that the historical model did not contemplate. It 
seems to make the Egyptians uneasy. The 1990 Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in 
Islam, adopted by a foreign ministers meeting of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, avoids the question of religious freedom and religious minorities 
altogether.124   
As we have noted, the freedom of religion is mentioned in the Egyptian 
constitution as well as in numerous instruments of international law to which Egypt is 
party.  Nevertheless, with  respect to the international human right of freedom of religion, 
Egypt’s position must be seen within the wider framework of the Muslim world. Most 
Muslim states maintain that Muslims are not allowed to abrogate their faith.  This view 
was not yet vigorously defended by the few independent Muslim states during the 
discussions of the (non-binding) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 
1948, which stipulates in Article 18: 
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Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
 Egypt ratified in 1982 the binding International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) of 1966, which allowed the “freedom to change his belief,” but was 
amended to say “freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice.”125  
Although this still appears to give a person the freedom to change his or her religion, 
Egypt is of the opinion that this provision does not violate the rules of shari’ah. The court 
interpreted the “freedom of belief” as a guarantee to practice one’s belief unhindered, 
with the following qualifications: 
The first of these two [i.e., the freedom of belief] is unrestricted, while the 
second [i.e., the practice of this belief] may be restricted by means of its 
[internal] order to affirm some of its highest interests, and in particular on 
the grounds of preserving public policy and moral values [al-nizam al-
’amm wa al’adab] and to the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. 126  
It is the concept of public policy (Maslaha) that may help to solve the riddle of 
the apparent contradiction of Egyptian jurisprudence disallowing apostasy, on the one 
hand, while upholding the freedom of religion on the other. This means that the Egyptian 
courts hold that since Islam protects the freedom of the constitution should grant each 
individual the right to freely embrace whichever religion he believes without constraint. 
However, the courted expressed the caveat that this freedom does not restrict the 
application of the Islamic shari’ah to only those who embrace Islam. It is asserted that 
since the State’s religion is Islam, then when a person embraces Islam, he must then 
submit a law that does not condone renunciation of one’s official identity as Muslim. 
Hence, the shari’ah is reflected in Egyptian law and constitutions and permits freedom of 
opinion, but within the limits of public policy, which prohibits the misuse of this right. 
No individual has the right to call for what contradicts the public policy or moral values 
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(al-nizam al’amm aw al-’adab), or use his opinion to harm the (Islamic) fundamentals 
upon which the society is built, interpreted to include reviling sacred things, or 
expressing contempt towards Islam or any other heavenly religion  Such transgressions, 
to include apostasy, according to both the Supreme Constitutional Court, as well as the 
ICCPR, are considered to be outside the scope of unrestricted freedoms. This ruling then, 
upheld the historical continuity between the present and the past: to depart from Islam has 
traditionally and juridically meant to revolt against it and this is what no Islamic law or 
state tolerates.  Thus, while the courts’ position on the (Islamic) interpretation of apostasy 
itself has undergone no change in Egypt, the political developments in the 1990s had 
serious repercussions. Until the 1990s, apostasy was mostly a clear situation of 
conversion, that is, an intentional act by a Muslim to convert to another religion. Usually, 
these converts had been Christians before becoming Muslim, and their conversions often 
were documented or otherwise easy to prove.  127 
A lower court ruling interpreted the Constitution’s guarantee of religious freedom 
as inapplicable to Muslim citizens who wish to convert to another religion. This ruling is 
under appeal. However, most recent reports indicate that this is the norm and will 
continue to be so.  According to the 2009 U.S. State Dept Report on Human Rights in 
Egypt: 
For the second consecutive year, a court—while calling for legislative 
reform to achieve effective protection for freedom of religion and to 
confront the manipulation of religion—ruled against a convert from Islam 
to Christianity who had appealed for official recognition of his conversion 
on the basis of constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion.128 
Only in July of 1997 did separate court rulings provided for 13 Christian-born 
converts to Islam to obtain identity documents indicating their conversion back to 
Christianity.   However, the courts included requirements effectively identifying the 
Christian converts potentially exposing them, if implemented, to risk of significant 
discrimination by both governmental and societal agents. Furthermore, governmental 
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authorities detained some converts from Islam to Christianity, some religious freedom 
advocates, and some Christian children of parents who converted to Islam.   
L. SUMMARY 
It should be clear to the reader that a significant amount of documented evidence 
that suggests that a pattern of discrimination based on religion exists in multiple areas of 
public life in Egyptian society. Nearly all of the large functional areas identified as being 
characteristic of the historic dhimmi experience were found to manifest aspects of 
differential treatment. The extent to which these modern discriminatory practices are 
Islamic, intentional, and consonant and continuous with the historical record will be the 
subject of my next chapter wherein I compare the practices of the modern with the 






 In this section I intend to briefly compare the historical record and the modern 
experience to see to what extent there are continuities and/or discontinuities. I will go 
down the list and point—by point compare the major areas i.e., the fundamental 
functional aspects that characterize the ethos of the system by which the dominant 
Muslim class administered and managed non-Muslims. As stated earlier, my objective is 
to determine the validity of the dhimmi analogy in the context of contemporary Egypt. It 
strikes me that at this point it would be useful, therefore, to remind the reader with a 
working definition what  the dhimmi experience-system consisted of, again making 
allowances for localisms, adaptations and mutation across time and space.  
First, and foremost the treatment of ahl al dhimma was based on divine revelation 
i.e., Quranic principles. Second, it was operationalized juridically by a class of 
theologian-scholars who provided rulers with a divinely sanctioned, yet adaptable method 
of dealing with the  “People of the Book”  who lived in their domains, yet still, in theory, 
claiming to derive from  divine revelation. Third, the system of differentiated customs, 
laws, usages, practices though claiming to be derivative of  the divine revelation, were  in 
fact, at times more consonant and some times less consonant with this authority. Fourth, 
the complex systems that eventually came into being  were part of an intentional and 
state-sponsored program with clearly articulated codices and administrative apparatus 
that yielded fairly consistent policies. These policies produced a steady and stable state of 
affairs.  They formed, bound, constrained, permitted, and circumscribed social 





B. POINT-BY-POINT COMPARISON 
1.  Religion’s Relationship to the State 
With regards to the relationship of Islam to the state, the historical record 
indicates that Islam, from the time of the first Islamic conquest of Egypt was the official 
religion and the laws were based upon the shari’ah.  Comparing this to the modern 
experience, we see that during the early period of the twentieth century, a distance 
between mosque and state began to appear. However, when President Sadat amended the 
constitution in 1980 to state that the shar’iah was the main source of the civil code, Egypt 
then officially ceased to have a separation of mosque and state. 
2. Legal Status of Citizens 
The brief period of secularity during the early decades of the twentieth century  
allowed the Christian community to attain a modicum of equality. However, with the 
advent of the free officers, Coptic gains in the area of civil rights began to recede and 
once Anwar Sadat amended article two of  the constitution to read that the shari’ah was 
to be the main source of the civil code,  Coptic hopes for a more egalitarian society faded 
even further.  If it were not for article forty of the constitution which upholds the full 
citizenship of all members of the three heavenly religions, conditions would resemble the 
historic two-tiered system. Later we will discuss the multiple interpretations of what 
application the contending voices say that the application of shari’ah does or should 
mean. For now suffice it to say that the data indicates that the Egyptian legal system, in 
terms of dealing with non-Muslim minorities, specifically ahl al dhimma, has generally 
tended to retrieve and replicate rulings that reflect the  classical applications of fiqh, 
aspects the historic millet management of religious minorities, and  not the ethos  of 
pluralism as recognized  in quranic revelations.  Although Nasser, under the rubric of 
affirming Copts equal status as full citizens, abolished separate courts,  that is was  
advantageous to the Christian community is a matter of debate: 
Following Nasser’s abolition of Muslim and Christian religious courts, 




Muslims and Copts, they now had to appear before Shari’ah trained 
Muslim judges seconded to the new civil courts. (Coptic religious judges 
were retired).129 
3.   Government/Military Service 
I could find no parallels between the historic levy of young Christian troops, such 
as intentionally and systematically practiced by the Ottomans according to the custom of 
devishirme, not could I find that today in Egypt there is any government program that 
privileges or discriminates, selects or bars anyone’s access to civil service at any level 
based on religion. That a degree of favoritism is shown to Muslims is probable, given the 
statistics and the reports. This, however, is a reflection of communal prejudices, biases 
and while certainly represent an injustice, lack the criteria of intentionality and state-
sponsorship that characterized the historic dhimmi experience. 
4.  Taxation 
Here, again, I found no continuity between the historic model of tax collection 
that involved the poll tax (jizya) and the land tax (kharaj) and the current system of 
revenue collection. All citizens in modern Egypt have for some time been taxed according 
to a system which is essentially blind to one’s religious affiliation. However, as mentioned 
in the discussion of taxation in the previous chapter, the distribution and expenditure of 
public funds appears to indicate the presence of a religiously oriented bias. Presumably 
state-sponsorship of Islamic institutions, such as al-Azhar,  Islamic broadcasting, 
construction and upkeep of mosques and payment of Muslim clergy entails the 
expenditure of taxes collected from all citizens, including Christians. Because Christians 
are barred from attending institutions which their taxes help support, and because their 
churches, clergy and religious programs receive no similar government subsidies, this 
suggests the presence of discrimination based on religious identity and a state preference 
for Islam over Christianity. While I do not find this situation to be analogous with historic 
experience i.e., a differentiated form of taxation imposed upon and collected from the ahl 
                                                 
 129  David  Zeidan, “The Copts: Equal, Protected, or Persecuted: The Impact of Islamization on 
Muslim-Christian Relations in Modern Egypt,”  Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 10, no 1, 1999): 58. 
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al dhimma in its specifics, I do find that there it does fit the criteria of reflecting an 
intentional, systematic and state-sponsored policy of religiously biased revenue 
expenditure.  
5. Church Building and Repair 
Church building and repair is an area wherein, until very recently, we could 
actually perceive a legal genealogy that demonstrated   that modern laws regulating the 
repair and rebuilding of churches descended from historic rulings grounded in the 
classical juridical tradition that typified the dhimmi experience. Until very recently, I 
believe that most reports would support the claim that Muslims, often with the assistance 
of the state, were able to build and repair mosques without having to go through any of 
the bureaucratic procedures, such as securing multiple permissions that Christians have 
had to learn to negotiate. The classical rulings that prevented obstructed and tightly 
regulated the repair and building of churches that date back to the Hatt-i-Humayon and 
go back even to the Pact of Umar, no longer seem to inform the policies of the Mubarak 
government in 2007 lifted the need for Christians to obtain a presidential decree.  While 
incidents persist in which individual Muslims attack and destroy churches,  this 
phenomenon now becomes a matter of social tension and inter-communal conflict rather 
than a matter of systematic, intentional, state-sponsored policy. Questions of police 
enforcement and protection, however, now become the focus as to whether or not the 
break with the past is real of merely pro-forma. 
6.  Religious Practices  
As already alluded to above, in today’s Egypt there are really no codified 
discriminators such as those found in the Pact of Umar or as practiced during the 
Ottoman period. Certain considerations about the timing of religious processions and the 
ringing of church bells persist however. The attempts by the authorities to regulate these 
practices now however are done so in order to avoid inciting conflict. Thus, security 
concerns or public order are not the reasons for controlling these practices, not to enforce 
a religious decree. As in the case of other aspects of the historical experience, a social 
87 
 
residue lingers and is expressed in the daily frictions between the two communities. For 
example, following the inauguration of a legally build church in the upper Egypt in 
February of 2002, Muslims reacted violently to the ringing of church bells. This attack 
produced a violent Christian counter-attack 
Security forces told Reuters that after a Muslim mob pelted the church 
with rocks, Coptic Christians responded by firing shotguns at their 
attackers. Muslims were apparently upset by the ringing of the church’s 
bells, despite the local authorities having been told beforehand about the 
form the inauguration ceremonies would take.130 
Copts charge that frequently the Egyptian government particularly the security 
forces and lower-level provincial authorities are complicit by not intervening more 
vigorously when extremist elements commit such acts. The government and the 
spokespersons of official Islam however, roundly denounce such acts and characterize 
them as isolated incidents committed by a small minority of fanatics. Again, here we 
must discern the difference between institutionalized oppression and independent 
Muslims who deploy as social forces acting on historic grievances or act on perceived 
loss of power or social position, grounded in a particular religious construct. What is not 
clear is the degree to which charges of official complicity are actually investigated. 
7. Communal Representation   
 There is really no evidence to support the notion that Egypt maintains a millet 
system wherein appointed leaders govern semi-autonomous religious communities in 
temporal matters. However, due to an underrepresentation of duly elected Christian 
members of parliament, there is a certain level of advocacy conducted by religious 
leaders on behalf of the Christian communities. The only area which one might suggest is 
similar to the millet system is in the area of the family courts. The family courts are still 
separate and based on religious identity and thus, the Coptic Orthodox Church wields 
significant power to shape legislation in this particular sphere.  Pope Shenouda, though 
                                                 
 130 Reuters,  quoted in “Christians and Muslims clash as church bells ring for the first time” U.S. 
Copts Association, February 18, 2002.  http://www.copts.com/english/?p=329#more-329   (accessed on 
October 31, 2009).  
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not possessing de-jure political office, nevertheless has a great deal of de-facto political 
power. This falls now into the realm of tradition, and warrants a discussion about the 
actual centers of political gravity, however, as a system, there is little actual resemblance 
to the historic rule of patriarchs under the millet system, wherein they were state 
functionaries who had the ability to collect taxes and govern. 
8. Conversions and Apostasy   
 Reports suggest that for the most part, there is significant continuity between the 
juridical structures that historically governed conversion away from Islam and the 
modern Egyptian legal system. However, punishments are much different now and less 
severe. Moreover, there is evidence that increased international pressure upon the 
government and al-Azhar as well has resulted in more moderate rulings and the 
overturning of more traditional rulings. Recent precedents worth citing are the adult 
Copts who were able to reclaim their Christian identity years after their parents converted 
to Islam, and a certain reluctance and lack of vigor on the part of authorities to prosecute 
individual Muslims who converted to Christianity. However, in general there is still 
sufficient grounds to claim institutional, intentional state-sponsored policy grounded in 
the traditional interpretation of shari’ah and application of fiqh to suggest continuity 
between the past and the present. The legal rubric under which apostasy is now 
considered should be noted and are now punished according in terms of their rights under 
personal status laws. According to this nuanced theory as articulated by those such as 
Tariq al-Bishri (b. 1933) a historian, a retired judge, and former head of Egypt’s state 
council, an apostate would still have his legal rights as a citizen, but should be socially 
punished for upsetting the public order.   According to Scott, Al- Bishri states that “social 
punishments for apostasy are because it constitutes an act against society and against 
Islam,’ not dissimilar from the punishments that the Coptic community seeks imposes 
upon its own apostates.131  
                                                 
 131 Tariq Al-Bishri, in Rachel Scott “Context Citizens in Modern Islamic Thought,”  Islam and 
Christian–Muslim Relations 18,  no. 1, January 2007): 13. 
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C. CHRISTIANS IN THE EGYPTIAN STATE: A TAXONOMY   
 After determining degrees of actual continuity and discontinuity between the 
historical dhimmi experience and the actual one, it is also important to consider the 
deployment in the present of the past in political terms, because in fact, that is the level 
on which it is most frequently the historic dhimmi experience is called into service. Thus, 
given the level nuance in terms of how the dhimmi narrative gets deployed and who 
deploys it, I have concluded that one of the most helpful notions might be to create some 
kind of taxonomy whereby one can classify the positions and the interlocutors.  
1. The Muslim Modernists 
At one end of the Muslim continuum are those who advocate a relatively 
pluralistic and egalitarian vision for Islamic Egypt and desire a recovery of what they 
claim to be the original quranic ethos. When they use the term dhimmi itself it is usually 
used in the original quranic sense of the “scriptuaries,” not with any desire to see a return 
to the millet system. These more moderate thinkers envision an Islamic Egyptian territory 
that has a place for non-Muslims. For these thinkers, the fabric of Islamic Egypt need not 
be uniform; it can be interwoven with a dhimmi presence without destroying the Islamic 
nature of the territory. This vision also has its roots in the later idea developed by jurists 
such as al-Shaybani in the Siyaar of dar al-sulh (land of treaty), which allowed for truce 
lines between Muslim and non-Muslim areas, even within dar al-Islam.  In the moderate 
vision, dhimmi communities are very much a part of the traditional landscape of Islamic 
Egypt. For the moderates, then, Egypt would have a place for the dhimmi Copts, certainly 
as full citizens.  However, the exact nature of this citizenship, as Sachedina noted earlier 
is somewhat foreign to the shari’ah and still and thus is a matter for considerable debate. 
Some moderates argue for full citizenship and rights for Christians and Jews in the 
Islamic state.   Other moderates see a more restricted participation for ahl al-kitaab. Ali 
Gomaa, the Grand Mufti  is one who fits into this camp and, at his harmonizing best, 
abandons the classical polemics of  Christian-Muslim dialogue, as witnessed interactions 
between the churches and al-Azhar seem to have departed from following the traditional 
polemics and argumentation, yet are still using classical forms to frame the issues, but 
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eschews official attempts to convert. Despite his contention that in modern Egyptian 
state, the old paradigms of the Ottoman millet system and pre-Ottoman rule are long 
gone, there are clear traces that persist particularly in the way the traditional ulema 
counseled the Sultan on the management of religious minorities.  
2.  The Muslim Brotherhood and Moderates   
The Muslim Brotherhood Al-ikhwan al-muslimun (the Muslim Brothers) is 
perhaps the most important example of a moderated and moderating group in Egypt. 
Though not so moderate in the past, it has recently been working through quasi-legal 
channels and by peaceful measures. Al-ikhwan advocates a less urgent approach to 
Islamic revolution and a relatively more conciliatory relationship with Coptic Christians,  
reference the Supreme Guide, Mehdi Akif’s rejection of the dhimmi analogy in an 
interview with Egypt’s leading independent newspaper, Misr al-Yaum. When asked about 
the status of Copts as dhimmis, Akif responded, “the matter of dhimmis is finished.  Do 
we take jizyah [a tax] from you?  The Muslim Brotherhood considers you citizens with 
the same rights and duties as the rest of us.  Are you not our partners in the homeland in 
everything?”132 Such Islamists appear for the moment to support full rights and 
citizenship for Copts in a future Islamic state, but it is difficult to see just how true and 
total equality would be realized in an Egypt under the MB version of shari’ah. While 
liberal, Wasattiyya  Christians are fully on board, the majority of Copts take a jaundiced 
view of   MB declarations such  as “the  [MB] organization’s vision rests on the concept 
of citizenship and equal rights for all, stressing that it wants to restore the caliphate in the 
spiritual realm, and not the political one.”133   The MB/ moderate Islamist view of the 
place of the Copts is ambiguous, and in the view of Copts, perhaps intentionally so. 
                                                 
132 Mahdi Akif  “Egypt’s MB Chief on Al-Qa’ida’s ‘Deviant’ Thought, Copts, Iraq, Clash With 
Regime” Cairo Al-Misri Al-Yawm in Arabic, November 24,  2007. http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/ 
(accessed October 3, 2009).  
133 Issander al Imrani, “The Emergence of a Coptic Question in Egypt,” Ikhwanweb: The Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Official English Web site, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=4326. (accessed November 
13, 2009) Liberal-minded Brothers such as Abd al-Mun`im Abu al-Futouh even advocated for Copts to 
build their churches without impediment yet skeptics charge that this is a ploy to for the MB to gain 
permission to build their own mosques.  
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Moreover, the wide-spectrum of “moderate” Islamist vision of Egypt is difficult to 
characterize as being uniform, stable, or consistent over time, hence a certain wariness 
and diffidence on their part. 
3. Pluralist Traditionalist Islamists 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an al- Azhar trained cleric living in exile in the Gulf  is 
popular on the Egyptian street. His CDs and cassettes are found in any Egyptian souk and 
are standard listening among many Islamists. Though hardly a moderate in his approach 
to Western culture and the state of Israel, Qaradawi advocates for a pluralistic and 
tolerant position towards ahl al dhimma, and clearly sees the past millet system as the 
model of the future. Thus, Qaradawi does not advocate total equality for non-Muslims; he 
argues they should be subject to the jizya tax,  and they must severely restrict any public 
display of Christian faith.   
Most importantly, he calls for a proscription on constructing new 
churches. Copts ‘should not display their symbols and crosses in Muslim 
territory and should not establish a church in a Muslim city where none 
existed before. This is an order since such a display is considered an 
affront to Islamic sentiment which may precipitate discord and 
disturbances.’134   
This sensitivity to displays of Coptic faith in the midst of Islamic territory is 
frequently seen among those who allow a place for Copts in Islamic Egypt. Given their 
predilection of the millet model, there remain serious questions about the nature and 
extent of that place, and the freedoms Copts would enjoy within it.    
4.  Militant Islamists 
In Egypt, militant Islamists are in the distinct minority among advocates of 
political Islam, however, their influence is disproportionate to their numbers and t during 
the 80s and 90s they succeeded in seriously damaging Christian-Muslim relations. For  
 
                                                 
 134 Yusaf Qaradawi, Ghayr al-muslimun fi al-mujtama al-islami (Beirut, 1983), in Mark Purcell, 
“Place of the Copts: Imagined Territory and Spatial Conflict in Egypt,” Ecumene (Vol. 8 No.4, 1998):  441.  
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militants, Coptic churches, crosses, icons and people are out of place in Muslim Egypt. 
They properly belong in dar al-harb, outside the bounds of dar al-Islam and outside the 
bounds of Egypt  
These militant Islamists counter the moderates and even traditionalist, pluralist 
Islamists by arguing that pluralism goes against the idea of the Islamic state and therefore  
the true Muslims state should refrain from seeing the People of the Book as dhimma, who 
deserve protection. Extreme militants reject the dhimma “special” category for Christians 
and Jews and argue that they should be considered unbelievers (kafirun).  Because they 
are kafirun, the Islamic state need not grant them special dhimmi status.   Christians and 
Jews should rightly be opposed and brought low, violently if necessary. According to 
their permissive and heterodox use of ijtihad, these militants do away with the classical 
categories of ahl al dhimma or ahl al-kitaab, and the world is divided into only two 
categories: Muslims and non-believers. Moreover, according to the most radical, the 
struggle against non-believers is elevated to the level of a personal duty for all Muslims. 
The most aggressive militants define Christians and Jews as hostile to Islam by 
definition, and intimate that they are in league with Western imperialism and are a kind 
of ‘fifth column.” The militant discourse associates Christianity with Western 
colonialism, and Judaism with Zionism, and plays up the theme of Muslims as historical 
victims of these two forces.  Because Protestants and Evangelicals trace their presence in 
Egypt to the colonial past and to foreign missionaries the militant discourse is particularly 
problematic and threatening. However, even in the so-called militant camp, there are 
those like the prominent and well-publicized Muhammad Imara, a regular guest on 
government TV shows who writes a weekly column in the government-owned al-Akhbar 
newspaper. Imara argues that the Qur’an urges Muslims to fight non-Muslims only when 
they are the aggressors and threaten Islam.135 
 
                                                 
 135  My senior contact at the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs explained  how Imara’s book,  
Fitnat Al-Takfir Bayna Al-Shi’a Wal-Wahhabiyya Wal-Sufiyya  (“The Civil Strife of Takfir Between 
Shi’ism, Wahhabism, and Sufism”), published in December 2006 had to be removed from the shelves 
because it was discovered that  Imara accused Christians of heresy and  noted that Islam permitted the 
killing of non-Muslims. Imara apologized and explained that he had only been quoting ancient sources 
permitting the killing of non-Muslims.   
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5.  The Nationalist/Multi-Confessional Vision 
This multi-confessional nationalist idea enjoyed its greatest popularity after the 
First World War and the national revolution of 1919, as mentioned before, when 
Egyptian resistance to British colonial rule began to grow. The Wafd party, the standard 
bearer for Egyptian nationalism and multi-confessionalism also had a purely secular tilt 
as well.  Many Copts became important players in the Wafd and helped found and direct 
it ideologically through its most influential years.   
According to this nationalist concept,  Egypt is a both a melting pot and an 
amalgam- what one might call a cultural and religious “pudding stone” that absorbed the 
cultures and religions that came to dwell in it, creating a unique identity of Egyptianess, 
but without the fusion and accompanying loss of identity of the individual components. 
Hence there are accretions upon accretions of distinct Pharaonic, Greek, Coptic, Arabic 
and Islamic peoples and cultures. This nationalist model, in contrast to the secular model 
does not separate religions from the state but incorporates it into a system that in theory is 
multi-confessional  In this vision, the non-Islamic cultures are the foundational cultures 
upon which, only later, does the Islamic  heritage get added on. Hence, there is the 
implied historic debit to Coptic culture, tradition and religion. In this view, it is as much 
the Copts as  the Muslims who flavor Egypt with its distinct identity.  In the multi-
confessional nation of Egypt, Copts are full members of Egyptian Society,  and never 
dhimmi, since for them the term connotes second-class citizenship, not simply a minority.  
Under this polity, they cannot be considered either “second-class” nor “out of place.”  
The pluralistic nationalist view of Egypt is still an influential idea in Coptic and non-
Islamist thought.  Pope Shenouda exhorts his Copts to support the nation-state’s view of 
Egypt, with its official doctrine of pluralism and equality before the law, despite the 
cognitive dissonance that arises from the often blatant discrimination they experience.  
6. The Post-Islamist Culturalists   
Like the Nationalist Multi-Confessionalists, some Christians have joined ranks 
with progressive Islamists to develop a Post-Islamic vision. They have taken part in 
constructing a national identity that validates the cultural and religious legacy of the past, 
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as providing a multi-confessional state with however, a more positive interpretation of 
the dhimmi experience. This imagined Post-Islamist Egyptian identity is to be constructed 
by Copts, Muslims and other Egyptians.  It is associated with the work of Ahmad Lutfi 
al-Sayyid, Muhammad Husayn Haykal and most recently Rafiq Habib an evangelical 
Christian and co-founder of the Wasat Party, among others.  This school of thought 
considers the population of the Nile region to be a single, separate territorial nation that 
has no links to the great Islamic community.  
These Christians like to point out that they share a long history with Muslims and 
readily claim a common identity with them. Makram Ebeid, a Coptic nationalist leader in 
the interwar years, liked to say that “Christianity is my religion, but Islam is my 
culture.”136    
Rafiq Habib, as an example of such a post-Islamist Christian asserts  Islam has 
provided the best political defense against Western cultural hegemony and keeping Egypt 
independent. According to Habib, Egypt  is the result of a common struggle for 
independence and nation-building in which the Muslim majority and the non-Muslim 
minority took part. In this way it differs sharply from the earlier caliphal, or Ottoman 
Muslim state that was based on conquest. In this situation it is the duty of the Muslim 
majority to concentrate on applying the principles established by God and the Prophet 
(rather than stubbornly insisting on applying outdated and inappropriate rules. Thus, 
Habib implicitly advocates, like the modernists, for an abandonment of the classical 
model of “dhimmitude” and a return to the utopian, pluralistic quranic ideal of the ahl al 
dhimma. This necessitates a movement in the relationship between Muslims and 
Christians “from one of contract (aqd), to one of constitution (dustour) and from dhimma 
to citizenship (muwatana)”137    
Abu  al-Magd,  A Christian, who had caught this vision was moved by the 
growing tension between the Egyptian regime and Islamic political extremism to issue a 
                                                 
 136 Phillipe Fargues “Demographic Islamization: Non-Muslims in Muslim Countries,” SAIS Review 
XXI, no. 2 (Summer–Fall, 2001):113.  
 137 Jorgen Nielsen, “Contemporary Discussions on Religious Minorities in Muslim Countries,”  Islam 
and Christian-Muslim Relations  14, no. 3 (July 2003): 330.  
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declaration of principles in 1991.  He responded in this declaration to the fear emanating 
from the Christian community, largely the traditional Copts, that in reality, Muslims 
would marginalize the Christians, given the overwhelming Muslim majority in the 
population of Egypt. Yet al Magd, asserted that on the contrary,  that a return to authentic 
ahl al dhimma status would be  “an historical expression of rights and duties 
guaranteed.”138 Such Christian thinkers claim that the institutions most representative of 
the classical experience of an oppressed ahl al dhimma are no longer present.  
He [Abu Magd] reaffirms his belief… that it is possible to write a modern 
constitution which gives full religious freedom and civil rights to all, 
Muslim or not. Therefore, according to Abu al-Magd, the rights of non-
Muslims in a modern Islamic state would be guaranteed in constitutional 
texts that have the highest legal standing and would be fully in consonance 
with the Shari’ah.  139 
7. The Nationalist/Secularist Vision 
Since the Nasser era, the political which most Copts are familiar with is one that 
has attempted to achieve the secular separation of religion and governance as 
operationalized in the West. While has not been a successful because it has largely never 
been achieved, it remains for many Copts the option of choice. Not entirely confident of 
their place in either the state’s or the Islamists’ imagination of Egypt, many continue to 
lobby for secularism.   As we know it, such a strategy is seen as a way to achieve 
separation of religion and government, thereby eliminating the differences in questions of 
citizenship and rights between Copts and Muslims.   The approach does not eschew 
religion, it only removes it from the public realm and makes it a private matter. Much of 
this work draws heavily from the Pre-Nasser Wafd Party legacy, which is itself derived 
from Western ideals.  We should note that this position, is also championed by a 
generation secular Muslims who, in defending the Copts are also defending themselves. 
According to  Sami Egyptian sociologist Sami Zubaida, spokesmen for this position, like 
the aforementioned Sa’ad Eddine Ibrahim note that his secular liberal view embraces “a 
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 139 Ibid.   
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campaign for human rights and democratic institutions, [which is] directed primarily at 
the government and the law,  but also increasingly against, the second, illiberal view of 
the Islamists”140. Therefore, there has been significant common ground here between 
Copts and Muslim secularists and modernists. Copts, especially those educated in Britain, 
France and the United States, have been supportive of  this.  Yet they are also cognizant 
of the fact that, according to Egypt’s constitutional formula, the state has failed to 
disassociate itself from official religion. Moreover, the protections they once had as 
dhimmi are gone. They are legally full citizens, a minority, often discriminated against for 
their religious identities, yet there is significant opposition by both the Muslim elite and 
Christian elite give them greater tutelage and protections. The grounds for this seem to 
have to do with the unusual understanding in Egyptian society that classification of the 
Christian community as a minority would somehow mean that a) they are not full-citizens 
and b) would mean a return to second-class dhimmi status. This is puzzling to many 
outside observers, particularly those familiar with secular Western models where full 
citizenship is in no way diminished by minority status, which only provides additional 
protections and programmatic over watch of the community’s civil rights. Thus, the 
Egyptian understanding of the secular model is in some ways quite unique. 
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
My objective in conducting this research and writing this thesis has been to 
evaluate the historical validity of the dhimmi analogy, and to analyze to what extent one 
can claim a pattern of continuity between the present and certain elements which typify 
the past.  In doing so, my hope has been that a clearer idea of how, by whom, and for 
what reasons the narrative is retrieved and constructed.  
My intent has been to be as anti-septic as possible, and by that I mean I have 
simply tried to examine the facts, not pass judgments, or provide ammunition to any 
particular side.  In drawing conclusions, I have been guided by two main sources of 
inspiration. The first source has been Hugh Goddard, a dedicated and balanced scholar of 
Christian-Muslim relations, whom I have cited numerous times in this paper.  Particularly 
with regards to the historical record, I take to heart Hugh Goddard’s admonition that the 
past cannot be measured with the same yardstick that we use to measure the present, and 
I try not to fall into the line of his fire as some modern Christian and Jewish authors have.  
Goddard asserts that those who do so fail to recognize that “by medieval standards, the 
Muslim treatment of Jews and Christians was relatively tolerant and liberal,” at the same 
time he acknowledges that “by modern standards [they would be] still discriminatory to 
some extent.”141   Thus, although this is a qualitative, not a quantitative study, I intend to  
“line up the data points, graph the intersection,” and let the facts speak for themselves.  
My second muse, whom I now call upon, is the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz. Though 
Geertz wrote extensively a generation ago about his studies of Muslim communities,142 I 
have, in a less obvious way, relied on his perspective and methodological bent. Although 
Geertz seriously under estimated the resilience of Islam and most religions for that 
matter, to respond to modernity, I have always appreciated how, in studying religion he 
                                                 
 141 Op Cit, Goddard, 68. 
 142 Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1971). 
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directed one’s focus to the context as much, if not more, than the dogmas, doctrines and 
texts. What he would call the “mediating conditions” that shape the religion, are those 
which in the end prove to be more important than the doctrines that make up the content 
of the religion. This has meant for me that, in the end, it is the practice of the community 
that matters. The interpretation Muslims and Christians give to what is happening in their 
everyday life of believers has more explanatory power than respective theological 
construct. Because Geertz’s understanding of Islam, as experienced in two very different 
societies (Morocco and Indonesia) brought out the diversity of Islam’s response to 
accommodate the way different cultures decide right from wrong and create meaning.   
Thus, I have opted for the perspective of Geertz,  wherein the context is the air without 
which the doctrines cannot breathe.    
I still have many unanswered questions about the dhimmi narratives (as separate 
from the dhimmi experiences) as it applies to the current Coptic situation, and   the rights 
and freedoms or religious minorities in a moderate Islamic state.  For present purposes, I 
can only conclude by identifying the multiple, critical roles the dhimmi narratives play on 
multiple levels, in the multiple Christian and Muslim communities. The use of the term 
dhimmi, or ahl al dhimma appears to be used in the following four ways in the current 
context of Christian-Muslim relations in Egypt, as:  
i. Historic description   
ii. Description of present religio-political reality 
iii. Narrative, analogy, and symbol in the service of social mobilization  
iv. Model for future religio-political relationships 
 
I will briefly summarize my analysis of the following ways the dhimmi theme is 
deployed, and address my original hypotheses in terms of continuity between the past and 
the present. 
B. AS HISTORIC DESCRIPTION   
The historic experience of religious minorities living under Islamic rule varied 
across time and place. Rulings in their specifics were modified; however, certain 
characteristics remained stable enough to demonstrate a desire by the Muslim state to 
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secure social homeostasis wherein, in exchange for a certain modicum of religious 
expression non-Muslim or ahl al dhimma were allowed concessions. The vast amount of 
documentation is conclusive enough to establish that from these origins, a much more 
tightly regulated structure for the ahl al-dhimma would develop under the Abbasid 
caliphs, as the shari’ah expanded into a comprehensive system of law for Muslims. Islam 
functioned as an institution of the state and its practitioners emerged only as state 
officials. Much recent scholarship across Ottoman territories indicates that in most 
circumstances, Muslims and non-Muslims interacted and intermingled relatively freely in 
the neighborhood, in the marketplace, and at court, and that compared to the treatment of 
non-Christians in Europe, religious minorities under Islamic rule fared much better. 
C. AS DESCRIPTION OF RELIGIO-POLITICAL REALITY   
Here is where I come to the crux of my thesis. Today, as in the past, Egypt is a 
religiously pluralistic society ruled by a pragmatic government and organized around a 
dominant public religious identity—Islamic. The uneasy coexistence between a 
pluralistic social environment and a demand for religious unity in both times allows for 
an examination into the ways in which authorities managed interaction among religious 
groups across cultures. Studying the blend of similarities and differences, continuities and 
discontinuities has provided an opportunity for comparisons that offer a broader 
perspective, as well as the value or limitations of historical analogies as models for inter-
religious relations.  
Varying degrees of both continuity and discontinuity are present between past and 
present.  The continuities are found in the larger normative ways that govern non-
Muslims but also in some specific ways.  My findings suggest that there are more 
differences in the specifics and while differential treatment, as applied to non-Muslims in 
the past, indeed exists today, the conditions and practices are significantly different from 





a. It would seem then, that at least in theory, toleration as a political policy, 
whether in Ottoman times or today’s pluralistic and globalizing Egypt, the formula that 
governs non-Muslim minorities is grounded mostly on the ideal of religious harmony and 
political dominance rather than on Enlightenment values. The Islamic teachings about 
pluralism are those derived from the traditional classical period, which despite the 
modernist vision and interpretation, are not egalitarian but rather, have historically sought 
to minimize conflict in pluralistic societies by ensuring domination of the Muslim 
majority by guaranteeing protection of select minority rights and privileges.   
b. In drawing parallels between   modern Egypt, and  historic record 
(Ottoman society in particular), patterns of official suppression and informal provision 
for private worship reveal a fundamental similarity to the management of religious 
difference through subordination and protection in modern day Egyptian society. Ruling 
elites in both times have blended measures of accommodation and repression to manage 
religious conflict.  Rulers have governed in such a way that demonstrates their need to 
keep minority community productive and but also the need to maintain the dominance of 
the Sunni Islamic public order.    
c. My findings indicate that while equality is the claim, the fact is that 
“toleration” is more likely to be the reality for most Egyptian Christians.  However, the 
rationale of the discourse has changed. More precisely, the accommodation of religious 
minorities in the context of modern Egypt seems no longer to be purely Islamic but to be 
a hybrid strategies drawing from two separate springs: first, modern, secular attitudes 
about human rights that come out of the European Enlightenment and second with 
historic Islamically-grounded model  of managing non-Muslim minorities.  
2. Discontinuities 
a. In terms of forced conscription government service or that which could be 
similar to the devirshirme there are no parallels evident. Nor are there the poll or land 
taxes that characterized the dhimmi experience. 
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b. The historic dhimmi experience was characterized by the fact that it was 
scripturally derived, religiously sanctioned, intentional, and systematic,  state sponsored, 
and was administered   with some consistency by a well-trained bureaucracy by members 
of both non-Muslim and Muslim communities. Moreover, it was concerned with public 
actions and public behaviors. In this regard, I find that there are significant discontinuities 
because many of the current discriminatory practices, deeply embedded in the social 
fabric though they may be, and the historic record. This does not mean that there is not a 
historic legacy and a significant residue. Yet fingerprints, at most can only point to a past 
transgression, and are not sufficient to establish that Christians still live under a system of 
“dhimmitude.”  
c. Having said as much, I would like to caveat that statement with the 
observation that the state does contribute to discriminatory injustices that have historic 
roots,  in the areas of uneven expenditure of tax monies, maintaining policies that impede 
the  building and repair of churches, and the promulgation of laws that permit and clearly 
favor conversion by a non-Muslim to Islam, but not vice-versa.  These practices do seem 
to be continuous with the historic system of differentiated treatment between Christians 
and Muslims, and bear enough resemblance to the historic record to cause the Christian 
population to not unjustifiably draw comparisons with the past. While there is uneven 
application and enforcement of these laws, one cannot dismiss them as aberrations, 
because they are still on the books, and moreover derive much of their authoritativeness 
to article two of the constitution that since President Sadat’s time reads the “ the shari’ah 
is the main source of the civil code.”  
D. AS ANALOGY IN SOCIAL MOBILIZATION   
The dhimmi narrative functions largely as an essentialism, often as a rhetorical 
device, largely, as just mentioned because it is undiscerning and conflates actions by 
individuals with the systemic, discriminatory intentionality and application exemplified 
by the millet system. As a way of understanding historical connections between the 
present and the past it has limited and circumscribed utility. Deployed as narrative or 
analogy by which to make meaning out of the present, it reinforces stereotypes, 
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confounds attempts at conflict resolution, and infuses the future with an unwarranted 
sense of pre-ordained path determinacy. According to Russell and Casebeer, narratives, 
among other functions,  in such situations  provide “justice frames which serve to 
mobilize discontent, justify the need for loyalty to the church and the group, reinforce 
pre-existing identities of the self and the other, create necessary identities where none 
exist, generate scripts of the  past, present and future. They serve to  interpret 
environmental conditions and identify threats to survival and they also actively motivate 
members and channel energies.”143: 
The dhimmi narrative does for the Christians what most narratives do when 
communities face a perceived or real existential threat. To Russell and Casebeers’ 
description of the ways that narratives function we can superimpose the schemata used by 
Roof who would place the functions of narrative under his two types, i.e., the 
“disorienting” and the “orienting.” 144  Both types run through the discourse of the Coptic 
community. The “disorienting” theme draws upon stories of the dhimmi experience i.e., 
theme of displacement, loss of status, subjugation, discrimination, persecution and  
perhaps most importantly marginality beginning with the Muslim conquest of Egypt. The 
“orienting” narrative is constructed upon two main pillars, the strength of Coptic 
monasticism as a bastion on cultural resistance and the suffering of the Coptic people, 
particularly the blood of the Coptic martyrs.  Clearly embedded in the dhimmi narrative, 
as lived and understood by the Copts, is that by means of their collective suffering, 
through persecution and even martyrdom and by keeping the faith, they will find 
salvation. The “disorienting” narrative is today also constructed from fragments of 
history, particularly fear of persecution at the hands of militant Islamists and the 
accompanying weakening of the community that occurs when large numbers emigrate or 
converted.  
                                                 
 143 William Casebeer and  James Russell, “Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive 
Counter-Narrative Strategy,”  Strategic Insights  IV, no. 3, March 2005, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nps/casebeer_mar05.pdf  (accessed October 6, 2009).  
 144  Wade Clark Roof, “Religion and Narrative: The 1992 RRA Presidential Address,” Review of 
Religious Research 34, no. 4, June 1993, University of California, Santa Barbara, 52.  
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E. AS A MODEL FOR FUTURE RELIGIO-POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS   
Although there is a small, and possibly growing group of Christians, such as 
Rafiq Habib who look beyond the present to a post-Islamist future, most members of the 
Christian community whom I spoke with voiced grave concern when speaking in the 
future tense. Much of their future anxiety surfaced when we discussed the perception of 
increased political power of Islamists and attacks against them from militant Islamists.  It 
appeared to me that in response to their disadvantaged situation, Christians have 
constructed both a future-oriented discourse of fatalistic resignation, or preparatory 
resistance. Both responses come, in my view, from a kind of “anticipatory anxiety” that 
itself has, however its roots in the past. Zeidan comments that “a main element in the 
unsteady balance of Muslim–Coptic relations in this century has been the tendency of 
unscrupulous politicians to manipulate the religious divide in an effort to strengthen their 
own position.” 145   
I listened to this anticipatory anxiety and accompanying anticipatory grievances, 
which were frequently voiced in terms such as “if the Islamists were to come to power, 
then we would be reduced once more to the state of dhimmitude.”  It is clear that the 
Islamization of Egyptian society, the growing power of Islamists, and the fear of  
unknown—what the implementation of shari’ah could bring—creates a sense of 
foreboding.  And secular Muslims share this sense of foreboding as well. In my view, 
because the Copts are the most vulnerable, the secular Muslim community watches them 
intensively, the same way miners keep an eye on the canary. A “real fear among Christians 
in Egypt” is attributed by the sociologist Sa’ad Eddiine Ibrahim146 to local Islamic 
extremists, but also to the failure of the state to fully include the Copts in the mainstream of 
public life. The Egyptian daily, al-Ahram, in response to MB and Islamist description 
about Egypt as an Islamist state posted ominous warnings:  
 
                                                 
 145 Roof, “Religion and Narrative,” 54.  
 146 Sa’ad Eddine Ibrahim, “Meditations on the Question of Minorities,” Ibn Khaldun Center, Cairo, 
1992,  in Phillipe Fargues, “Demographic Islamization: Non-Muslims in Muslim Countries” SAIS Review 
21, no. 2 (Summer–Fall, 2001): 103–116.  
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It is sufficient to read the reform initiative issued by the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the spring to realize how remote their thinking remains 
from the underlying principles of a modern democratic state. That 
document was a blatant call for the establishment of an Islamic state that 
would become the cornerstone of Islamist universalism. It would revive 
the hisba system, imposing strict moral guardianship, or policing, over 
women and over artistic and cultural expression. It would deprive Copts of 
full citizenship rights, and it would establish religion rather than a civil 
constitution as the basis for the relationship between the citizen and the 
state.147 
The unchecked traditionalist and militant Islamist discourses that look backwards 
cause the Christians to be alarmed and to believe that “oppression will be cast upon them 
regardless of how non-violent it may appear.” 148 Islamist clerics like the popular and 
vocal Shaykh Kishk, throughout the 1090s, accused the Copts of having been historically 
involved in the Crusades, and of having formed pacts with Western powers and 
Zionists.149    
It appears that every mosque that gets build with public funds, and every church 
that cannot be tells the Christians that they are a second-class citizen. Every attack 
against Copts, every church burnt down, or not repaired, every threat and  barrier to 
conversion, or legal impediment to the recovery of Christian identity, every assertion of 
the Islamic character of the Egyptian national identity, and claim by officials of the  
superiority of the Islamic state  makes claims of   Christian-Muslim unity and equality 
seem quite distant and hollow.   
Barbara Tuchman notes in her book, Practicing History that there are three things 
that make a good historian and they are the investigative, the didactic and the 
narrative150. The scope and focus of this study has been to establish the degree of 
historical continuity or discontinuity, and to understand the power and applicability of the 
historical narrative to the present. Having gone through this exercise, it appears there is 
                                                 
 147 Sameh  Fawzi, “Brothers and Others,” al-Ahram Weekly, no.772, December 8–14, 2005). 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/772/op8.htm  (accessed October 15, 229). 
 148 Op Cit, Henderson, 164.  
 149  Op Cit, Zeidan, 62.  
 150 Barbara Tuchman,  Practicing History: Selected Essays (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1981). 
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sufficient evidence to suggest that the dhimmi analogy/narrative/trope is so frequently 
applied that a second study is indicated in order to explore the possibility that the 
cognitive and psychological power and appeal of religious myths and narratives might be 
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